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One of the main barriers to the utility of the International Cognitive Ability Resource 
(ICAR) is that no research to date has been conducted on its construct validity using a theory –
based individual cognitive assessment battery. The aim of the current study was to examine the 
relations between the ICAR16 items and the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) broad abilities as 
measured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV). Research 
questions include: 1) Is there evidence of the convergent validity of the ICAR16 when compared 
with a gold-standard individual assessment of cognitive abilities? And, 2) Which CHC constructs 
are related to the respective ICAR subtests? 
Data was collected from a convenience sample of university student volunteers (N = 67) 
and a clinical sample from a university-based assessment center (N = 30) who completed the 
ICAR Sample Test (ICAR16) and the ten core subtests of the WAIS-IV. To address the first 
research question, the correlations between the confirmatory-factor estimated general factors 
from the ICAR16 and WAIS-IV were examined. The model fit the data well (𝛘2 (19) = 14.15, p= 
.78) and revealed a large correlation between the general factors (r =.94, p<.001). The range-and-
reliability-corrected correlation between the WAIS-IV FSIQ and the ICAR16 total score was 
also large (rICAR16, FSIQ= .81 p<.001). 
To address the second research question, correlational methods of examining convergent 
and discriminant validity were employed. Evidence from range-and-reliability-corrected 
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correlations suggests that the ICAR16 Letter-Number Series task is most closely related to fluid 
reasoning (Gf) (r=.70, p<.01) while the Matrix Reasoning, Verbal Reasoning, and Three-
Dimensional Reasoning tasks are most closely related to visual-spatial reasoning (Gv) (r=.35-
.75). As a point of discriminant validity, all of the ICAR tasks demonstrated the lowest 
correlations with measures of processing speed (Gs) or working memory (Gsm) (r=.07-.32).  
Findings suggest that the ICAR16 provides a valid estimate of nonverbal intelligence. 
Results of the present study suggest that the ICAR16 may not be sensitive enough to 
discriminate between distinct CHC abilities, though more specific associations may be revealed 
in a larger sample. The present study provides a foundation for future validation and use of the 
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Chapter 1: An Examination of Convergent Validity of the ICAR16 using the WAIS-IV 
1. Introduction 
Cognitive abilities are among the strongest known predictors of academic achievement 
(Deary, Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007; McGrew & Wendling, 2010; Rohde & Thompson, 
2007), occupational success (Kuncel & Hezlett, 2001; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), and individual 
health and well-being (Batty & Deary, 2004; Batty, Deary, & Gottfredson, 2007; Deary, Batty, & 
Gale, 2008), which explains the commercial success and widespread use of proprietary tests of 
cognitive abilities such as the Woodcock-Johnson, Wechsler, and  Kaufman batteries. 
Commonly referred to as intelligence quotient (IQ) tests, proprietary cognitive ability 
assessments have historically targeted educational, clinical, and industrial settings (Elliott, 2007; 
Kaufman, 2004; Schrank, Mather, & McGrew, 2014; Wechsler, 2014). The primary focus of 
these assessments is to identify patterns of strengths and weaknesses within individual examinees 
to provide meaningful feedback and guide decision making-processes in practical contexts.  
Although commercial assessments are mainly designed for and marketed towards end-
users (e.g., school psychologists, neuropsychologists, human resources personnel), primary 
researchers tend to default to these tools as well. For example, in a research synthesis of 134 
analyses of intelligence data, 126 analyses used Woodcock-Johnson cognitive assessment 
products, and the remaining studies used other commercial measures (McGrew & Wendling, 
2010). Continuity of measurement between research and practice offers obvious benefits in 
applied clinical fields, yet the measurement needs of primary researchers often diverge from 
those of commercial test users, particularly for those in nonclinical fields. Researchers interested 
in evaluating the relation between cognitive abilities and a range of other constructs tend to be 
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less concerned with interpretive feedback than clinical test users, for example (Condon & 
Revelle, 2014).  
Unfortunately, most existing proprietary assessments are expensive to access, require 
trained administrators, and are prohibitively time-consuming to administer in the context of a 
research study (see Camara, Nathan, & Puente, 2000). Limited accessibility to measurement 
tools may prevent the inclusion of important cognitive ability variables in studies across a variety 
of fields, and in turn stifle research progress (Gambardella & Hall, 2006; Goldberg, 1999). 
Flexible, well-validated tools in the public domain can help make cognitive ability measurement 
more accessible for researchers across fields.   
1.1 International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR) 
To address the lack of accessibility of cognitive assessment in primary research, Condon 
and Revelle (2014) developed the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR), a public-
domain assessment tool with four published item types, and several other types under 
development. The aim of the ICAR project is to encourage broader assessment of cognitive 
abilities in the social sciences and healthcare fields by providing flexible, unrestricted test items 
to researchers (Revelle et al., 2014). Although a wealth of well-established commercial cognitive 
ability measures exists, free measures tend to be proprietary or not well validated. For example, 
the most common freely available battery, the ETS Kit, lacks sufficient evidence of its construct 
validity, and its usefulness in primary research has been called into question (Babcock & 
Laguna, 1997). Higher quality assessment tools are beginning to emerge to address the 
accessibility problem of cognitive measurement in research. Notably, the NIH toolbox offers a 
validated cognitive battery at a low cost to researchers (Akshoomoff et al., 2014), however, this 
tool is not freely available in the public domain. The ICAR is the first non-proprietary resource 
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that freely distributes items to qualified researchers and encourages researchers to develop and 
contribute items for use and validation by others.    
Initial analyses provide evidence of the reliability, factor structure, and predictive validity 
of the four item types from a large, international sample of individuals ages 14 to 90 who 
completed the assessment online (Condon & Revelle, 2014; Young, Keith, & Bond, 2020). The 
convergent validity of the ICAR items was also evaluated against the Shipley-2, another brief, 
self-administered measure of cognitive abilities (Shipley et al., 2009). Shared characteristics (e.g. 
self-administration, brevity) make the measure a useful point of comparison for the ICAR, 
however there has been little research on the construct validity of the Shipley-2 (Reynolds et al., 
2016) and the few studies that have evaluated the measure have raised concerns about its 
usefulness (Beaujean et al., 2017; Reynolds et al., 2016). One of the main barriers to the 
adoption of the ICAR is that no research to date has been conducted on its construct validity 
using a gold-standard, individually-administered cognitive battery. 
1.2. Cattell-Horn-Carroll Theory 
Many contemporary tests of intelligence have either been developed upon or have been 
adapted to fit within the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory of cognitive abilities (Keith & 
Reynolds, 2010). Although alternative theoretical frameworks for intelligence exist (see Das, 
Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Gardner, 1987; Johnson & Bouchard, 2005), CHC theory offers the 
most empirical support, is most frequently applied in assessment, and is considered to be the 
common language to communicate intelligence test scores and research findings (Flanagan & 
Harrison, 2012; Keith & Reynolds, 2010; McGrew, 2005, 2009).  
CHC theory proposes a three-stratum hierarchical model of intelligence, with one 
superordinate general intelligence factor at the apex that influences several broad abilities, which 
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in turn influence even more narrow abilities (Carroll, 1993). Each of these abilities have 
important implications, but a few broad abilities tend to stand out in terms of their factor 
cohesion, and strength of their association with general intelligence (Table 1) (McGrew & 
Wendling, 2010; Taub, Keith, Floyd, & Mcgrew, 2008).  See the Integrated Analysis chapter for 
an in-depth discussion of CHC and competing theories of intelligence.  
Table 1. Selected CHC Broad Abilities Commonly Measured by Cognitive Ability Tests 
CHC Broad Ability Description 
Fluid Reasoning (Gf) 
The ability to use deliberate and controlled mental operations to 
solve novel problems. May be viewed as the aptitude to learn and 
drives the development of other abilities. Strong relation with 
general intelligence. 
Verbal Comprehension (Gc) 
The knowledge of cultural information acquired primarily 
through the process of acculturation. Primarily language based. 
 
Visual-Spatial Ability (Gv) 
The ability to generate, store, retrieve, and transform visual 
images and tactile sensations. 
Working Memory (Gsm) 
The ability to apprehend and maintain awareness of a limited 
number of elements of information in the immediate situation.  
Comprised of memory span and working memory. Based on the 
Baddley model of working memory (Baddeley, 2001) 
Processing Speed (Gs) 
The ability to automatically and fluently perform simple or over-
learned cognitive tasks, especially when a high degree of focused 
attention is required. 
Note. Descriptive note. Adapted from McGrew, K. S. (2009). CHC theory and the human 
cognitive abilities project: Standing on the shoulders of the giants of psychometric intelligence 
research. Intelligence, 37, 1-1. 
 
Among the broad abilities, fluid intelligence (i.e. the ability to solve novel problems; Gf) 
and crystallized intelligence (i.e. stored knowledge and its retrieval; Gc) tend to correlate most 
highly with general intelligence (Schneider & McGrew, 2012; Schrank, Decker, & Garruto, 
2016). Gf, in particular, is often viewed as an approximation of general intelligence  (Aken, 
Kessels, Wingbermühle, Veld, & Egger, 2016; Gustafsson, 1988; Kvist & Gustafsson, 2008; 
Schneider & Newman, 2015) and its measurement tends to be relatively less culturally-
dependent than other broad abilities (Arvey, 1972; Raven, 2000; Schneider & Newman, 2015). 
Gf has also been shown to have a strong relation to working memory (Gsm) (Au et al., 2015; 
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Martínez & Colom, 2009), and there is some evidence Gf is the driver of the accumulation of 
acquired knowledge (Gc) and visual-spatial ability (Gv) (Bigler, Johnson, Jackson, & Blatter, 
1995; Gong et al., 2005; Martínez & Colom, 2009). For these and other reasons, Gf has been the 
focus of many brief measures of intelligence (Hossiep, Turck, & Hasella, 1999; Johnsen, 2017; 
Kvist & Gustafsson, 2008; J. Raven, 2000). The content of the ICAR items suggests Gf is also 
the main construct measured, but research has yet to confirm this idea.  
The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV), is one of the most 
commonly used and well-validated measures of intelligence and of CHC abilities, and appears to 
measure four to five CHC broad abilities well (Benson, Hulac, & Kranzler, 2010; Niileksela, 
Reynolds, & Kaufman, 2013; Weiss, Keith, Zhu, & Chen, 2013). Thus, an investigation of how 
the ICAR items relate to the WAIS-IV provides evidence of construct validity for the existing 
ICAR item set, as well as build a foundation for the development of additional items and future 
















Arithmetic (AR) Solve math word problems presented 
verbally. 
Gf .88 .72 
Block Design (BD) Construct a visually displayed pattern 
with three-dimensionally colored 
blocks. 
Gv .87 .77 
Coding (CD) Translate strings of numbers to 
figures designated in a key under a 
time constraint. 
Gs .86 .90 
Digit Span- 
Forward (DS-F) 
Recite a series of numbers presented 
orally verbatim 
Gsm .81 .56 
Digit Span-Backward 
(DS-B) 
Recite a series of numbers presented 
orally in reverse order 
Gsm .82 .72 
Digit Span –
Sequential (DS-S) 
Recite a series of numbers presented 
orally in sequential order 
Gsm .83 .73 
Information (I) Answer general information questions 
presented verbally about a variety of 
topics. 




Select the image that best completes the 
pattern presented visually. 
Gf .90 .74 
Similarities (SI) Describe how two words presented orally 
are similar. 
Gc .87 .86 
Symbol Search 
(SS) 
Mark the presence or absence of a target 
figure in a series of figures under a time 
constraint. 
Gs .81 .78 
Visual Puzzles 
(VP) 
Select three shapes to create a larger two-
dimensional shape. 
Gv .89 .70 
Vocabulary (VC) Define words presented orally. Gc .94 .87 
Source: Essentials of WAIS-IV Assessment, Second Edition by E. O. Lichtenberger, and A. S. 
Kaufman, 2012, p. 34-38. Copyright 2012 by John Wiley & Sons Inc.  
 
The aim of the current study was to examine the relations between the ICAR items and 
the WAIS-IV. Scores on the assessments from a convenience sample of university student 
volunteers and a clinical sample from a university-based psychological assessment center were 
analyzed and interpreted. Bivariate correlations and factor analytic methods were used to 
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examine the following research questions: 1) How does the ICAR16 compare to the WAIS-IV as 
an overall estimate of general intelligence? And, 2) How do the respective ICAR item types 
relate to the CHC broad abilities as measured by the WAIS-IV?  
2. Method and Materials 
2.1. Sample  
Data were collected from two samples: an existing database of 30 university students 
ages 18 to 28 who sought assessment services at a university-based assessment center, and a 
convenience sample of 67 student volunteers ages 18 to 45 from the same large, southwestern 
university. Volunteers were recruited through the university’s college of education subject pool 
and word of mouth. A priori participation criteria excluded participants who completed a WAIS-
IV or an ICAR16 within in the last year, and participants with WAIS-IV Full Scale Intelligence 
Quotient (FSIQ) scores of less than 70, though no such cases presented in either sample.  
 The clinical sample differed slightly from the volunteer sample in regard to age, FSIQ on 
the WAIS-IV, ICAR16 total score, and year in university (Table 3). Participant age, FSIQ scores, 
and total scores on the ICAR16 were lower in the clinical sample, though within one population-
based standard deviation of the volunteer sample (WAIS-IV norming sample standardized 
mean=100, S.D.= 15; ICAR16 norming sample mean=8.05, S.D.= 3.73). Furthermore, the 
average FSIQ score obtained by participants in the clinical sample was slightly higher than those 
of the respective norming samples (Condon & Revelle, 2014; David Wechsler, 2008). Thus, 
differences in the two samples were statistically significant but not clinically meaningful, and the 
combination of the two samples does not substantially threaten the validity of analyses for the 









Sample Clinical Sample 
t-test 
statistic p-value 
N (Female) 97 (51) 67 (32) 30 (19)   
Age 22.47 (4.08) 23.06 (4.37) 21.17 (3.02) 2.46 0.02 
FSIQ 112.94 (11.20) 116.09 (10.71) 105.59 (8.93) 4.87 <.01 
ICAR16 9.82 (3.83) 10.45 (3.85) 8.43 (3.47) 2.55 0.01 
Note: Age, FSIQ, and ICAR16 statistics presented as Mean (Standard Deviation). 
 While the combined sample was roughly evenly distributed by gender, participants were 
largely homogenous in age, racial/ethnic identity, and education level (Table 4). The majority of 
participants who provided race and ethnicity information identified as white and non-Hispanic. 
Due to the sampling process, all students had at least some higher education experience. WAIS-
IV and ICAR16 norming samples were also made up of majority white and non-Hispanic 
participants, but offer more diversity in regard to age and education level.  
 

















Age    
  Mean (SD) 22.47 (4.08) 42.26 (13.82) 25.71 (10.64) 
  Range [18.32, 45.57] [16, 90] [14, 90] 
Female % 51 50 68 
Racial Identity %    
  White 59 70 68 
  Asian 29 4 10 
  Black or African American 3 12 8 
  Other 6 14 14 
  No information -- -- -- 
Ethnic Identity %    
  Hispanic (Any race) 16 14.5 7.8 
  Not Hispanic 50 85.5  
  No information 31 -- -- 
Education %    
  <12 years 0 16 16 
  12 years 34 31 6 
  13-16 years 58 28 69 
  >16 years 5 25 9 
  No information -- -- -- 
Note. *Race/Ethnicity information is not included in the ICAR norming data set and instead was 
gathered from Condon and Revelle (2012). Race/ethnicity Information is based on U.S. 
participants only at the time of publication and may not be reflective of demographics of the full 
sample. Demographic information about the WAIS-IV sample was estimated based on statistics 
in the WAIS-IV Technical and Interpretive Manual (Wechsler, 2008) 
2.2 Measures 
 
2.2.1 Demographics Questionnaire  
The demographics questionnaire was a brief online survey administered through 
Qualtrics. The survey instrument collected information about age, gender, race, ethnicity, 
parental education, and college education. The demographic survey is included in Appendix D.  
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2.2.2 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV).   
The WAIS-IV is an individually administered test of intelligence for adults ages 16 to 90 
(Wechsler, 2008a). It contains 10 core subtests (see Table 2) which yield four composite indices, 
a Full-Scale IQ (FSIQ) score, and a General Ability Index (GAI). The Full-Scale IQ (FSIQ) 
score is derived by summing scaled scores reflecting performance with 10 core subtests and 
corresponds to psychometric g. The GAI is an alternative estimate of general intelligence that 
excludes measures of Gsm and Gs (i.e. AR, DS, CD, and SS). The WAIS-IV also includes four 
composite scores that reflect broad ability areas: the Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI, a 
measure of Gc); the Perceptual Reasoning Index (PRI, a measure of Gf and Gv); the Working 
Memory Index (WMI, a measure of Gsm); and the Processing Speed Index (PSI, a measure of 
Gs) (Weiss et al., 2013).  
The WAIS-IV Technical and Interpretive Manual reports the normative sample included 
2,200 individuals and was demographically representative of the U.S. population based on age, 
gender, ethnicity, geographic region, and education. Internal consistency was moderate to high (r 
= .71 to .96) for the individual subtests, and very high for the Full-Scale IQ (r = .97 to .98) and 
the GAI (r=.96 to .98) (Table 2). Moderate to high correlations between the WAIS-IV subtests 
and the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test, 2nd edition (r = .42 to .80), and with the 
previous edition of the WAIS (r = .33 to .81) provide evidence of predictive and concurrent 
validity, respectively (Wechsler, 2008).  
2.2.3 International Cognitive Ability Resource-16 item (ICAR16).   
The 16-item subset of the 60-item International Cognitive Ability Resource was 
published by Condon and Revelle (2014) as a sample test and is included in Appendix E. The 
ICAR16 items are self-administered, multiple choice, and untimed. The respective multiple 
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choice item types ask participants to identify: the missing element in a pattern of digit or letter 
combinations (Letter Number Series, LN, 9 items), the missing shape in a 3x3 array of geometric 
shapes (Matrix Reasoning, MR-I, 11 items), the correct response to a variety of logic questions 
and math word problems (Verbal Reasoning, VR, 16 items), and the response choice that is a 
possible rotation of a stimulus figure (Three-dimensional Rotation 3DR, 24 items) (Condon & 
Revelle, 2014).  
The ICAR16 includes four items from each of the four item types. Table 2 provides the 
reliability coefficients and the estimated factor loading on the general factor for each item type 
from a subset of the online sample consisting of 1909 individuals. This subset was 72% female 
with a mean age of 19.7 (SD=1.2). Information about nationality, race, ethnicity, and education 
were not provided about this subsample. Internal consistency was acceptable for each of the four 
types except for Matrix Reasoning (MR-I), which was only marginally acceptable. The average 
reliability of ICAR16 was adequate (α= .81; ω total=.83) while the full 60-item set was good (α= 
.93; ω total= .94). As expected, the long-form version demonstrated higher reliability, however, 
slightly more variance was extracted from the ICAR16 by the general factor (ICAR16 ω 
hierarchical= .66; ICAR60 ω hierarchical = .61).  










LN .68 .63 .71 .8 
MX .52 .67 .56 .7 
3DR .74 .49 .76 .5 
VR .59 .72. .62 .7 




The ICAR16 was selected for use rather than the ICAR60 for several reasons. The first 
aim was to replicate the concurrent validity assessment procedures from Condon and Revelle 
(2014) Study 3 in order to interpret results across studies. Additionally, the sampling style of 
Condon and Revelle (2014) was such that participants completed random subsets of the ICAR60, 
while the ICAR16 sample test was administered in its entirety to a subset of participants. 
Another advantage to validating the ICAR16 is that although all 60 items are available upon 
authorization, researchers must apply to use the items, and they are not yet packaged together. 
Alternatively, the ICAR16 sample test was published in Intelligence as a supplementary material 
to Condon and Revelle’s (2014) article introducing the measure. The ICAR16 also offers sound 
psychometric properties but in a briefer, more accessible format than the ICAR60, and is likely 
to appeal to a broad group of researchers.  
2.3 Procedure 
In the clinical sample, participants who sought assessment services through a university-
based assessment clinic completed an intake survey via email to collect relevant demographic 
and educational information. Within this survey, participants were provided a detailed 
description of the study, which explained the study purpose and indicated their consent to have 
their de-identified data used for research purposes upon completion of testing (Appendix C). 
Consenting partipants then completed the 16-item ICAR Sample Test within the same Qualtrics 
survey. Participants were administered the ten core subtests of the WAIS-IV within a larger 
battery of neuropsychological assessments.   
Students who volunteered to participate apart from the clinical sample were administered 
the same consent forms, demographic survey, the ICAR16 items, and the ten core subtests of the 
WAIS-IV within the same session. All participants were assessed on the WAIS-IV by trained 
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graduate student examiners in the university assessment center and supervised by a licensed 
psychologist. After data collection, all data were stripped of identifying information and 
combined for analysis.  
2.4 Analysis 
Correlational analyses were conducted in RStudio (RStudio Team, 2019) with the psych 
package (Revelle, 2019). To address the first research question (i.e., How does the ICAR16 
relate to the WAIS-IV as an overall estimate of general intelligence?) the correlation between the 
CFA-estimated general factors from the ICAR16 and WAIS-IV was examined and compared to 
those between other brief, homogenous assessments of cognitive ability tests with traditional 
intelligence batteries. The general factor for the ICAR was indicated by the total scores from the 
four subtests. The general factor on the WAIS-IV was indicated by the four main composite 
indices (VCI, PRI, WMI, and PSI). Pearson correlation coefficients between the total score on 
the ICAR16 and the FSIQ and GAI observed scores were also examined.  
 To address the second research question (i.e. which CHC constructs are related to which 
ICAR item types?), correlations between variables hypothesized to measure the same construct 
were compared with those thought to measure disparate constructs (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).  
An a priori power analysis was conducted to determine the minimum sample size necessary to 
obtain Cohen’s (1988) recommended power of .8. A moderate effect size of r=.3 was selected to 
reflect the smallest correlations typically observed in concurrent validity studies using the 
WAIS-IV and batteries similar in length and nature to the ICAR (Balboni, Naglieri, & Cubelli, 
2010; Bell, Rucker, Finch, & Alexander, 2002; Krach, Loe, Jones, & Farrally, 2009; Lodge, 
2012; Salthouse, 2009). A two-tailed bivariate normal distribution power analysis with an alpha 
error probability of .05 revealed a sample size of 84 participants is necessary to detect the effect 
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size desired, which is achieved with the current sample.  
To represent the CHC broad abilities, broad ability composite (BAC) scores were created 
using the interpretive system presented by Lichtenberger and Kaufman (2012) (Table 6). The 
following Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated: 1) the correlation between the 
respective BAC scores and the ICAR item type composite scores, 2) the correlations between the 
individual WAIS-IV subtest scores and the ICAR item type composite scores, 3) the correlations 
between the FSIQ score and the ICAR16 total scores, 4) the correlation between the GAI score 




Table 6. Lichtenberger and Kaufman (2012) System for Interpreting CHC Broad Abilities 
Factor Name Core Five-Factor Model Internal Consistency 
Coefficient (α) 
Crystallized Intelligence (Gc) Vocabulary + Information .96 
Short-Term Memory (Gsm) 
Digit Span Backwards + 
Digit Span Sequencing 
.88 
Fluid Reasoning (Gf) 
Matrix Reasoning + 
Arithmetic 
.93 
Visual Processing (Gv) 
Block Design + Visual 
Puzzles 
.93 
Processing Speed (Gs) Symbol Search + Coding .90 
Note. Descriptive note. Adapted from Essentials of WAIS-IV Assessment, Second Edition by E. 
O. Lichtenberger, and A. S. Kaufman, 2012, p. 166-169. © 2012 by John Wiley & Sons Inc.  
 
Because the sample is homogeneous in terms of education attainment (i.e. all participants 
had been admitted to a selective university), correction methods for restriction of range and 
reliability were replicated from Condon and Revelle (2014) Study 3. Bryant and Gohale (1972) 
and Alexander (1990) provide formula (1) for correcting restricted correlations between two 
variables, x and y, selected on a third unmeasured variable: 
?̂?𝑥𝑦= rxy(sx/Sx)(sy/Sy)±√( 1 − (𝑠𝑥/𝑆𝑥)2)(1 − (𝑠𝑦/𝑆𝑦)2)    (1) 
where ?̂?𝑥𝑦  is the correlation between the item scores on the respective tests corrected for 
restriction of range, sx and sy are the standard deviations in the restricted sample (i.e. the study 




 Due to the relatively small sample size of the study, published reliabilities (Wechsler, 
2014) for the WAIS-IV subtests as well as the ICAR16 item type scores (Condon & Revelle, 
2014) were used instead of the sample reliabilities. Formula (2) was applied as a correction to 
provide a more accurate estimation of the correlations by accounting for measurement error 




        (2) 
where ?̂?𝑥′𝑦′ is the correlation between the WAIS-IV subtest scores and the ICAR16 composite 
scores corrected for reliability, 𝑟𝑥𝑦  is the correlation of the variables in the present study sample, 
and 𝑟𝑥𝑥 and 𝑟𝑦𝑦 are the reliabilities of the variables from their respective norming samples. 
Correlations between ICAR item type composites and WAIS-IV subtest scores were 
compared to evaluate if there is a statistically significant difference between ICAR16 subtest 
scores and the (hypothesized) related and unrelated WAIS-IV subtests, respectively. For this, a z-
test for inequality of two dependent Pearson r’s, also known as a Steigler’s z-test for correlated 
correlations within a population (Steiger, 1980), was employed. The formula is as follows: 
z = zwx – zwy *
√𝑁−3
√2∗(1−𝑟𝑥𝑦)∗ℎ
         (3) 
where h = 
1−(𝑓∗𝑟𝑚2)
1−𝑟𝑚2
  (4)   and f = 
1−𝑟𝑥𝑦
 2∗(1−𝑟𝑚2)
  (5) and  𝑟𝑚2= 
𝑟𝑤𝑥2+𝑟𝑤𝑦2
2
  (6) 
and where rwx and rwy represent the correlations between a given ICAR composite and a 
hypothesized related WAIS-IV subtest and the same ICAR composite with a hypothesized 
unrelated WAIS-IV subtest. rxy represents the common index correlation, the correlation between 
the unrelated WAIS-IV subtest and the related WAIS-IV subtest in question. Subtest and 
composite index correlations were sourced from the WAIS-IV Technical and Interpretive 
Manual. zwx and zwy represent the Fischer’s z transformations of rwx and rwy respectively. 
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 As a point of reference for discrimination, each correlation between the ICAR composite 
scores and the related BAC scores were compared to correlations between those of the latter and 
the Gs BAC score. Gs was chosen as a point of discrimination for two reasons. First, Gs is not 
explicitly measured on the ICAR as the items are untimed. Second, measures of Gs demonstrate 
the lowest correlations with the WAIS-IV subtests that measure the constructs of interest on the 
ICAR, namely Gf and Gv (Wechsler, 2008).  
3.  Results 
3.1. Research Question 1: Is there evidence of convergent validity of the ICAR16 when compared 
with a well-established, long-form measure of intelligence? 




Figure 3. Correlated Two-Factor Model 
 Correlations between ICAR general factor and WAIS general factor were expected to be 
large, similar to other tests of abilities (r > .7). The two-factor model (Figure 2) fit the data well 
(𝛘2 (19) = 14.23, p= .77; RMSEA < .001, 90% C.I. (.000, .062); CFI = 1.000; TLI = 1.045) and 
revealed a large correlation between the general factors (r =.94, p<.001).  
 Correlations between the observed general intelligence scores were also hypothesized to 
be large (r>.7), though smaller than those between the general factors. Pearson correlations were 
calculated for the observed general scores on the WAIS-IV, the FSIQ and the GAI, and the 
ICAR16 total score respectively. Uncorrected correlations were significant but did not reach the 
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hypothesized magnitude of r=.7. Range and reliability corrected correlations were slightly higher 
than uncorrected correlations and exceeded the expected magnitude. Contrary to expectations, 
neither uncorrected nor corrected correlations demonstrated any statistically significant 
differences in correlations between the ICAR16 total scores and the FSIQ and GAI, respectively.  











[.49, .73] .26 .79 




[.61, .80] .41 .69 
Corrected for Restriction of Range 




[.74, .87] .21 .84 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Restriction of range was corrected by using formula (1) from Bryant and Gohale (1972) 
and Alexander (1990). Formula (2) from Murphy and Davidshofer (1988) was then applied to the range-corrected 
correlations to using the reliabilities published in the WAIS-IV technical manual (David Wechsler, 2008) and the 
initial ICAR validation study (Condon & Revelle, 2014).  
 
3.2. Research Question 2: Which CHC Constructs are related to the ICAR types? 
 Correlations between the raw broad ability composite (BAC) scores and ICAR16 subtests 
and confidence intervals were calculated, and then sequentially corrected for range and then 
reliability to replicate the correction process of Condon and Revelle (2014) (Table 7, 8, 9). 
Uncorrected, range corrected, and range-and-reliability corrected correlations between ICAR16 
subtests and the ten core subtests on the WAIS-IV are provided in Appendix B.  As expected, 
visual inspection of the correlations revealed each ICAR16 subtest correlated the highest with Gf 
or Gv, and the lowest with Gsm or Gs. Steigler’s z tests were conducted to determine if the 
magnitudes of the correlations with the BAC scores were statistically different from one another 




Table 8. Uncorrected Correlations Between Raw Broad Ability Composites and ICAR16 Subtests 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
                      
1. Gf 37.65 5.38                 
                      
2. Gv 66.27 13.38 .39**               
      [.21, .55]               
                      
3. Gc 61.83 9.53 .38** .18             
      [.19, .54] [-.02, .37]             
                      
4. Gsm 18.68 4.01 .41** .17 .35**           
      [.23, .57] [-.03, .36] [.16, .52]           
                      
5. Gs 115.08 20.75 .27** .25* .14 .29**         
      [.07, .44] [.05, .42] [-.06, .34] [.09, .47]         
                      
6. LN16 2.42 1.54 .56** .35** .34** .33** .32**       
      [.40, .68] [.16, .51] [.15, .51] [.14, .50] [.13, .49]       
                      
7. MR16 2.51 1.31 .37** .39** .24* .30** .22* .42**     
      [.18, .53] [.21, .55] [.04, .42] [.11, .48] [.02, .40] [.24, .57]     
                      
8. VR16 3.20 0.95 .27** .46** .22* .30** .08 .39** .34**   
      [.08, .45] [.29, .60] [.02, .41] [.10, .47] [-.13, .27] [.21, .55] [.15, .50]   
                      
9. 
R3D16 
1.70 1.47 .20 .33** .31** .19 .06 .41** .39** .19 
      [-.00, .38] [.14, .49] [.11, .48] [-.02, .37] [-.14, .26] [.23, .56] [.21, .55] [-.01, .38] 
Note. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% 
confidence interval for each correlation. The confidence interval is a plausible range of population correlations that could have 
caused the sample correlation (Cumming, 2014). * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
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Table 9. Range Corrected Correlations Between BAC scores and ICAR16 Subtests 
Variable Gf Gv Gc Gsm Gs LN16 MX16 VR16 
R3D1
6 
1. Gf 1         
2. Gv .39** 1        
3. Gc .51** .26* 1       
4. Gsm .41** .17 .35** 1      
5. Gs .26** .26** .14 .29** 1     
6. LN16 .56** .35** .34** .33** .34** 1 
   
7. MX16 .37** .39** .24* .30** .23* .41** 1   
8. VR16 .34** .55** .28** .37** .10 .46** .42** 1  
9. 
R3D16 
.17 .29** .27** .16 .07 .38** .35** .16 1 
Note. Restriction of range was corrected by using formula (1) from Bryant and Gohale (1972) and Alexander (1990). manual 
(David Wechsler, 2008) and the initial ICAR validation study (Condon & Revelle, 2014). Values in square brackets indicate the 
95% confidence interval for each range corrected correlation. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01.  
 
Table 10. Range and Reliability Corrected Correlations Between BAC Scores and ICAR16 Subtests 
Variable Gf Gv Gc Gsm Gs LN16 MX16 VR16 R3D16 
1. Gf .93         
2. Gv .42** .93        
3. Gc .54** .27** .96       
4. Gsm .46** .19 .38** .88      
5. Gs .29** .27** .16 .33** .90     
6. LN16 .70** .44** .42** .43** .41** .68    
7. MX16 .53** .56** .35** .45** .32** .70** .52   
8. VR16 .46** .75** .38** .52** .14 .76** .76** .59  
9. R3D16 .21* .35** .33** .20 .07 .52** .57** .26* .71 
Note. Formula (2) from Murphy and Davidshofer ( 1988) applied to the range-corrected correlations in Table 9 using the 
reliabilities published in the WAIS-IV technical manual (David Wechsler, 2008) and the initial ICAR validation study (Condon 




Based on the item content, scores on the Three-Dimensional Rotation (R3D16) items on 
the ICAR16 were expected to correlate the most highly with measures of Gv on the WAIS-IV. 
The range and reliability corrected correlation between Gv and R3D (r=.35) was greater in 
magnitude than correlations with other broad ability scores (Table 11) but was only moderate in 
effect size and only statistically larger than Gs (z= 2.40, p=.02).  Furthermore, correlations were 
smallest with Gs (r=.06) and negligible in effect size, though their correlation was not 
significantly smaller than correlations with any other BAC scores except Gv and Gc.  
Table 11. Steigler's z Test of Differences Between R3D16 and Respective BAC Scores 
Target Correlation 
(Corrected r) vs. 
Comparison Correlation  
(Corrected r) z sig 
Gv (.35)  Gs (.06) 2.40 .02* 
Gc (.33)  Gs (.06) 2.03 .04* 
Gv (.35)  Gsm (.20) 1.35 .18 
Gv (.35)  Gf (.21) 1.23 .22 
Gc (.33)  Gsm (.20) 1.22 .22 
Gf (.21)  Gs (.06) 1.21 .23 
Gc (.33)  Gf (.20) 1.17 .24 
Gsm (.20)  Gs (.06) 1.14 .25 
Gf (.21)  Gsm (.20) .225 .82 
Gv (.35)  Gc (.33) .08 .93 
Note. Z indicates Steigler’s z (1980). * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 Like other matrix tasks, matrix Reasoning (MX16) scores were expected to correlate 
most highly with measures of Gf on the WAIS-IV, relative to other subtests. Contrary to a priori 
hypotheses, the MX16 scores correlated most highly with Gv (r=.58), but this correlation was not 
significantly different from the correlation with Gf (z=.42, p=.68) nor Gsm (z=1.52, p=. 13) 
(Table 12). The lowest correlation was with Gs, though this was not statistically different from 
the correlation with Gc (z=.04, p=.97) nor Gsm (z=.69, p=.49). It was also expected that MX16 
would correlate the highest with the corresponding Matrix Reasoning subtest on the WAIS-IV, 
but that was not supported by the data (Appendix B). The range and reliability corrected 
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correlation between MX16 and the WAIS-IV Matrix Reasoning subtest was moderate in 
magnitude (r=.42, p<.001), but indistinguishable from the correlation between MX16 and Block 
Design (r=.46, p<.001) and Arithmetic (r=.49, p<.001) respectively. Furthermore, MX16 
correlated the highest with the Visual Puzzles subtests on the WAIS-IV (r=.66, p<.001).  
Table 12. Steigler's z Test of Differences Between MX16 and Respective BAC Scores 
Target Correlation 
(Corrected r) vs. 
Comparison Correlation 
(Corrected r) z sig 
Gv (.56)  Gs (.32) 2.29 .02* 
Gf (.53)  Gc (.35) 2.12 .03* 
Gv (.56)  Gc (.35) 2.07 .04* 
Gf (.53)  Gs (.32) 1.95 .05 
Gv (.56)  Gsm (.45) 1.20 .23 
Gf (.53)  Gsm (.45) 1.08 .28 
Gsm (.45)  Gc (.35) 1.01 .31 
Gsm (.45)  Gs (.32) .88 .38 
Gv (.56)  Gf (.53) .39 .70 
Gc (.35)  Gs (.32) .20 .84 
Note. z indicates Steigler’s z (1980). * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 Letter-Number Series (LN16) scores were expected to correlate most highly with 
measures of Gf on the WAIS-IV, which was supported by the data (Table 13). Correlations with 
Gf were significantly higher than those with all other BAC scores. It was also hypothesized that 
scores on the LN16 task would correlate the lowest with Gs, however, correlations with Gs were 




Table 13. Steigler's z Test of Differences Between LN16 and Respective BAC Scores 
Target Correlation 
(Corrected r) vs. 
Comparison Correlation 
(Corrected r) z sig 
Gf (.70)  Gc (.42) 3.78 <.01** 
Gf (.70)  Gsm (.43) 3.45 <.01** 
Gf (.70)  Gs (.41) 3.28 <.01** 
Gf (.70)  Gv (.44) 3.22 <.01** 
Gv (.44)  Gs (.41) .31 .76 
Gsm (.43)  Gs (.41) .20 .84 
Gv (.44)  Gc (.42) .16 .88 
Gc (.43)  Gs (.41) .14 .89 
Gv (.44)  Gsm (.43) .11 .91 
Note. z indicates Steigler’s z (1980). * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 Scores on the Verbal Reasoning (VR16) items were expected to correlate most highly 
with measures of Gf on the WAIS-IV, relative to other broad abilities, however, this was not 
supported by the data (Table 14). Scores on the VR16 task correlated most highly with the Gv 
estimate, and this correlation was significantly higher than correlations with all other broad 
ability estimates. It was also expected that scores on the VR16 task would demonstrate the 
lowest correlation with Gs, but these correlations were indistinguishable from the correlation 




Table 14. Steigler's z Test of Differences Between VR16 and Respective BAC Scores 
Target Correlation 
(Corrected r) vs. 
Comparison Correlation 
(Corrected r) z sig 
Gv (.75 )  Gs (.14) 6.375 <.01** 
Gv (.75)  Gc (.38 ) 4.247 <.01** 
Gv (.75)  Gf (.46 ) 3.767 <.01** 
Gsm (.52 )  Gs (.14 ) 3.541 0 
Gf (.46 )  Gs (.14 ) 2.906 0 
Gv (.75 )  Gsm (.52 ) 2.814 0 
Gc (.38 )  Gs (.14 ) 1.93 .05 
Gsm (.52 )  Gc (.38 ) 1.427 .15 
Gf (.46 )  Gc (.38 ) .973 .33 
Note. z indicates Steigler’s z (1980). * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
4. Discussion 
 To the author’s knowledge, the present study is the first independent validation of the 
ICAR, and the first to examine the construct validity of the tool using a well-validated and 
theory-informed measure of cognitive abilities. Data from a convenience sample of 97 university 
students was used to examine the correlations between scores on the ICAR16 and the WAIS-IV. 
The WAIS-IV is known to measure up to five broad abilities well based on Cattell-Horn-Carrol 
theory of intelligence, and composite scores were constructed to estimate the broad abilities 
measured using the guidelines of Lichtenberger and Kaufman (2012). Correlations between 
ICAR16 subtest scores and the broad ability composite (BAC) scores were corrected for 
restriction of range and reliability using published variances and reliabilities from the respective 
ICAR and WAIS-IV norming samples.  
 In regard to research question 1, “Is there evidence of convergent validity of the ICAR16 
when compared with a well-established, individual cognitive ability battery?”, a priori 
hypotheses were largely supported. The correlations between the general factors indicated by the 
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four subtests on the ICAR16 and the four composites scores on the WAIS-IV was large (r=.94, 
p<.001) and the model fit the data well (𝛘2 (19) = 14.23, p= .77; RMSEA < .001, 90% C.I. (.000, 
.062); CFI = 1.000; TLI = 1.045). Correlations between the respective observed general ability 
scores on the WAIS-IV, the FSIQ and GAI, and the total score on the ICAR16 were also large, 
as expected. The uncorrected correlations between the overall scores and the ICAR16 total 
scores did not reach the hypothesized magnitude of r=.7 (rICAR16, FSIQ= .62, p<.001, rICAR16, GAI= 
.61, p<.001), but the range and reliability corrected correlations exceeded this level (rICAR16, FSIQ= 
.81 p<.001, rICAR16, GAI= .81, p<.001).  
It was hypothesized the correlation between the ICAR16 total score and the GAI would 
be higher than that between the ICAR16 total score and the FSIQ, as GAI does not account for 
scores on measures of processing speed and working memory. Contrary to expectations, the 
ICAR16 total score correlations between GAI scores and FSIQ scores were not distinguishable 
from one another. Findings support the ICAR16 as a broad measure of general cognitive ability, 
but on its own may not be sensitive enough to distinguish between “higher order” cognitive 
abilities (e.g. fluid reasoning, verbal comprehension) and more basic cognitive functions (e.g. 
working memory and processing speed).   
In regard to research question 2, “Which CHC Constructs are related the ICAR types?”, 
findings only partially supported a priori hypotheses. Evidence from range and reliability 
corrected correlations suggests that the ICAR subtests are strongly related to fluid reasoning (Gf) 
and visual-spatial processing (Gv) abilities. As expected, the Letter-Number Series subtest 
correlated highest with the fluid reasoning estimate, and this correlation was significantly larger 
than correlations with other abilities. The other ICAR16 subtests also demonstrated moderate to 
high correlations with Gf, but all three also demonstrated relatively larger correlations with Gv.  
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Contrary to expectations, the Matrix Reasoning subtest and Verbal Reasoning subtest 
both correlated highest with measures of Gv. Visual-spatial processing is strongly related to fluid 
reasoning, and there has been debate among scholars as to whether or not the two are actually 
distinct constructs (Dombrowski, Canivez, Watkins, & Alexander Beaujean, 2015; Weiss et al., 
2013).  
For the Matrix Reasoning subtest, the correlations with Gf and Gv were not 
distinguishable, but nor were they distinguishable from the working memory estimate (Gsm), 
which is related to but consistently distinct from Gf (Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Engle, 
Tuholski, Laughlin, & A, 1999; T. L. Harrison, Shipstead, & Engle, 2015; Heitz et al., 2006). At 
the subtest level, the MX16 correlated the highest with the Visual Puzzles subtest (r=.66, p<.001) 
rather than the Matrix Reasoning subtest as expected (r=.42, p<.001). Some recent research has 
demonstrated that Gv is more important in matrix tasks than previously believed, and in some 
groups, equally important as Gf (Waschl et al., 2017). Taken together, findings suggest that the 
matrix task on the ICAR primarily measures Gv (and perhaps more so than other matrix tasks), 
though it likely involves multiple abilities. It should also be noted that the reliability of the 
Matrix task published in the ICAR norming study was only marginally acceptable (α =.52), so 
corrected and uncorrected correlations should be interpreted with caution.  
The high correlations between Gv and the Verbal Reasoning subtest are not easily 
explained. Although Gf and Gv are highly related, the differentiating factor is the quality of 
visual stimuli, which is completely absent in the VR16 task. The VR16 task correlated highest 
with scores on the Block Design (r=.59, p<.001) and Visual Puzzles (r=.68, p<.001) subtests, 
which were significantly higher than correlations with the subtest most similar in item content, 
Arithmetic (r=.39, p<.001). This finding may result from imprecise representation of the  Gv 
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factor by the WAIS-IV subtests; at least one study indicated the Visual Puzzles subtests relies on 
multiple abilities in a mixed clinical sample (Fallows & Hilsabeck, 2012). Given the 
inconsistency with theory, the strength of the relation between Gv and the Verbal Reasoning task 
may be a statistical artefact, and replications are necessary.  
Hypotheses about the relations of broad abilities with the Three-Dimensional Rotation 
subtest were weakly supported by the data. Correlations were the highest with Gv, but these 
correlations were not significantly different from correlations with any other ability construct 
aside from Gs. This finding may be due to the difficulty of the R3D16 items. Item information 
functions from the initial validation study indicated that the discrimination of the R3D16 items 
peaked at about one standard deviation of latent ability higher than the other item types (Condon 
& Revelle, 2014). Furthermore, informal behavioral observations from study administrators 
noted that participants often reported needing much more time to complete these items, and that 
the items were more difficult. Including R3D items that are similar in difficulty to the WAIS-IV 
tasks may reveal more distinct relations with specific abilities.  
   As expected, the ICAR subtests demonstrated the lowest correlations with the 
processing speed ability estimate, Gs, except for LN16 which demonstrated a negligibly smaller 
correlation with Gsm. All correlations with Gs were significantly lower than the highest 
correlations between the respective ICAR tasks and BAC scores, however correlations with Gs 
were not distinctly lower than correlations with other broad abilities in all cases. Consistent with 
the results from research question 1, findings suggest the ICAR16 is most related to Gf and Gv 
abilities but may not be sensitive enough to distinguish between distinct abilities at this sample 
size.   
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   Overall findings provide initial evidence of convergent and discriminant validity of the 
ICAR16, with correlations between the ICAR16 subtests being generally higher with estimates 
of fluid reasoning and visual-spatial processing, and generally lower with estimates of ostensibly 
indirectly related or unrelated abilities, such as processing speed and working memory. Results 
should be interpreted with caution, as correlations did not reveal clear distinctions between the 
constructs measured and suggest that the ICAR16 and/or the sample are not sensitive enough to 
distinguish between broad abilities. Correlational evidence is considered preliminary to more 
advanced statistical methods in larger samples that may reveal more well-defined associations 
with certain broad abilities.  
5. Limitations 
The present study has several important limitations that challenge the generalizability and 
interpretability of the findings. First, the heterogeneity of item difficulty may have confounded 
the correlation comparisons. Some ICAR tasks, such as the Three-Dimensional Rotation items, 
were much more difficult than the WAIS-IV items, while other tasks, such as the Verbal 
Reasoning items which involve logic or word problems, can be easily solved by a university-
level student with unlimited time.  
   The generalizability of the results is challenged by the nature of the sample. First, 
homogeneity in regard to race, ethnicity, education, and socioeconomic status limits the 
generalizability of the findings. The inclusion of a clinical convenience sample further reduces 
the generalizability of the findings; although the majority of students who seek assessment 
services at the university-based center perform in the average to superior range on cognitive 
testing, psychopathologies such as specific learning disorders, ADHD or mood disorders that are 
common among this population may influence performance on both the ICAR16 and the WAIS-
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IV. Thus, these analyses should be replicated in larger, more diverse samples in order to ensure 
generalizability.  
   The most salient limitation of the present analyses is the relatively small sample size. 
Although adequately powered to detect the observed correlations between subtests, the collected 
sample was not powered to detect smaller differences between correlations. It is possible that in a 
larger, more highly powered sample would be sensitive enough to better differentiate between 
distinct abilities. Similarly, due to the small sample, correlations were corrected for restriction of 
range and reliability. Although these corrections improve the accuracy of the observed 
correlations, they call into question results from Steigler's z tests, which are intended for 
uncorrected Pearson Correlations. Significance tests are not intended for corrected correlations, 
and conclusions about statistically differences between correlations warrant caution. 
   Correlational methods can only provide evidence of convergent and discriminant 
validity; they do not confirm which ability constructs contribute to performance on the respective 
tasks. Moreover, larger sample sizes are needed to account for multiple statistical comparisons of 
correlations. Visual inspection of correlations is qualitative in nature, so findings are considered 
exploratory and provisional. Confirmatory factor analytic approaches are necessary to parse out 
the effect of method of administration of the respective tests and error (Marsh, 1994; Nussbeck, 
Eid, & Lischetzke, 2006). The results from this study can be used as preliminary evidence of 
convergent and discriminant validity of the ICAR16 and verifies that correlations are sufficiently 
large to conduct factor analytic approaches.  
6. Conclusions 
The results of the present study provide evidence that the ICAR16 is a valid brief 
measure of general intelligence, and correlates with general ability estimates on the WAIS-IV at 
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a magnitude similar to other brief measures of intelligence (Floyd, McGrew, & Evans, 2008; 
Johnson, Bouchard, Krueger, McGue, & Gottesman, 2004; Johnson, te Nijenhuis, & Bouchard, 
2008; Salthouse, 2014; Sanders, McIntosh, Dunham, Rothlisberg, & Finch, 2007). The ICAR 
subtests demonstrated the largest correlations with fluid reasoning and visual spatial processing 
tasks on the WAIS-IV, and the smallest correlations were with measures of processing speed or 
working memory. However, many of these correlations were indistinguishable from correlations 
with other broad ability estimates. Future research should confirm the strength of these relations 
using larger sample sizes and factor analytic methods.  
  Limitations aside, the present study offers several strengths as well. It is the first study 
to examine a public domain measure of cognitive abilities with a well-established, traditional 
battery. Results provide a theoretical context for the ICAR that previously did not exist, which 
will spur the development of new and improved items for a wider range of ages and ability 
levels. The current sample may serve as a linking sample for the norming samples of the ICAR 
and WAIS-IV respectively and facilitate planned missingness research designs. Finally, findings 
provide a foundation for future research on the validity of the ICAR test as well as for the use of 
the ICAR test as a brief, self-administered measure of nonverbal cognitive ability.  
7. Implications 
         The present findings have a number of implications for the use of the ICAR in primary 
research. First, even though scores on the ICAR correlated with scores on the WAIS-IV at 
magnitudes similar to those observed between similar tests of abilities, it is notable that the 
method of administration of the ICAR is categorically different than other brief measures. The 
ICAR is completely unmonitored and self-administered online; examinees have access to the 
internet, scratch paper, calculators, and unlimited time to complete the items. Considering the 
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freedom of examinees, it is remarkable that the error due to method of administration did not 
interfere with subtest correlations to a larger degree. For example, the Shipley-2 shares many 
more administration characteristics with the WAIS-IV than the ICAR; it is self-administered but 
must be monitored by a trained examiner, subtests are time-limited (10 minutes for Vocabulary 
and 12 minutes for Block Design/Abstraction), and it includes a verbal scale in addition to the 
nonverbal scale (parinc.com). Despite more administration similarities, Lodge (2012) found the 
Shipley Composite A to correlate with WAIS-IV FSIQ at a similar magnitude to the ICAR16 
total score in a comparable population (rShipley-2,FSIQ = .78, p<.001, , rICAR16, FSIQ=.62 p<.001)1. 
         Equivalence of public domain tools to commercial measures could translate to substantial 
savings for researchers who are interested in brief measures of general cognitive ability. 
Researchers who test a sample of 100 participants with the Shipley-2 would spend $767 on 
materials and anywhere from 30 to 250 minutes in administration time, depending on individual 
or group administration (parinc.com), while the costs of using the ICAR are negligible. The time 
and money savings of the ICAR compared to a WAIS-IV are even more impressive; the WAIS-
IV costs $2,129.65 for materials and an average 900 minutes of administration and scoring time 
(pearsonassessments.com). In this regard, the ICAR offers obvious advantages, especially for 
studies in which an estimate of cognitive ability can serve as a covariate (see Appendix F for a 
review of potential areas of application). The ICAR will also be particularly useful in large-scale 
studies in which administering individual or even group measures to hundreds of participants is 
not feasible regardless of budget. However, brief measures like the ICAR are typically not good 
 
1 Lodge (2012) provided uncorrected Pearson correlation coefficients from a much smaller 
sample of university students (N=25). Uncorrected correlations from the present study were 
provided for consistency. 
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substitutes for traditional batteries for researchers whose primary variables of interest are specific 
cognitive abilities.  
Strengths aside, it is important to highlight the limitations of the ICAR in its current 
form. Weakness in the psychometric properties of the ICAR item set present a problem for 
usability of the tool. Like many other brief measures, the internal consistency of the 4-item 
subtests is low, especially for the Matrix Reasoning items. Only one study to date has examined 
the measurement invariance of the tool for examinees of different ages and genders (Young, 
Keith, & Bond, 2019), and no studies have examined invariance across other salient dimensions 
of identity such as race/ethnicity, nationality, or native language. As the tool is intended for 
wide-spread international use, further rigorous validation is necessary to ensure the items 
measure the same constructs equally for all examinees. 
One of the major findings of the present study is that the ICAR16 in its present form is 
not a multidimensional measure of cognitive abilities. It provides a broad estimate of combined 
fluid and visual spatial reasoning, but it cannot differentiate between the two constructs. This 
imprecision limits the usefulness of the tool and warrants caution for its use in fields outside of 
psychology which may not be as familiar with the nuances of cognitive ability measurement.  
For example, there has historically been some debate over which broad abilities are most 
representative of general intelligence (see a discussion between Robinson (1999, 2005) and 
Ashton et al (2001; 2005)), let alone a unified definition for “general intelligence” as a construct 
more broadly. From this lens, one could argue that the ICAR should be seen as a test of 




Offering an ostensibly valid intelligence test to the public domain also brings up ethical 
concerns around who is using the tool and for what purposes. The history of intelligence testing 
is fraught with controversy and the legacy of oppression in the field should not be 
underestimated (see Appendix G). Messick (1979) argues that contemporary intelligence test 
developers have an ethical responsibility to evaluate not only the validity of assessments in terms 
of their measurement properties, but also the social consequences of their use. One of the 
advantages of proprietary measures is that test developers are generally trained in the proper use 
and application of intelligence tests and can control how the tools or validation data are used. For 
example, the developers of the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cognitive Abilities have refused to 
release information about participant race/ethnicity for certain types of research studies. 
Researchers also must apply to use the ICAR items and agree to use the items according to 
standards put forth by the British, American, and German Psychological Societies as well as 
“participate in this project in a manner other than one which observes the highest standard of 
ethical conduct” (icar-project.com). Despite these assurances, once the items are published, 
controlling their use is difficult if not contrary to the spirit of the public domain. 
  Several papers have been published using the ICAR since 2014, many of which focus on 
associations between personality and cognitive ability (see Dworak et al., 2020) though some are 
more polarizing than others. For example, Fuerst and Kirkegaard (2016)  “set out to determine 
whether there was a fairly consistent, positive relationship of racial ancestry with both cognitive 
and socioeconomic outcomes in the Americas (p. 351)” using the ICAR. Methods and results 
aside, the goal of the authors is ambiguous and reminiscent of the unsavory past of intelligence 
testing, and the interpretation and applications of this type of research warrants extreme caution. 
Because intelligence is often erroneously conflated with human worth in our society, and 
 
 36 
intelligence testing has many potentially oppressive applications, responsibility falls on research 
consumers to critically and ethically interpret findings and their implications. Rather than acting 
as gatekeepers for access to the tool, the research community should instead rigorously evaluate 
not only the methods, analyses, and design of research produced using the ICAR, but also its 
guiding theory, goals, and potential applications. 
Potential ethical concerns should not deter the use of the ICAR, but rather should be at 
the forefront of conversations about its applications, advantages, and limitations. Researchers 
across fields who are interested in measuring cognitive abilities, even as a covariate, should have 
a strong background in the ethical use of testing instruments. There is a risk of misapplication 
with any intelligence test, and publishing testing tools in the public domain may increase that 
risk, but the risks do not outweigh the benefits. Increasing accessibility to research tools presents 
the opportunity to drive down research costs, increase researcher productivity, promote data 







Chapter 2: Integrative Analysis 
The study of intelligence is well-served by dozens of measures of cognitive abilities, 
though contemporary research typically relies upon only a few established proprietary batteries 
(Condon & Revelle, 2014; McGrew, 2009). Despite their extensive research base, these 
measures pose several challenges for primary researchers interested in the relationship between 
the various cognitive abilities and other constructs and outcomes. An accessible and affordable 
method of accurately measuring cognitive ability is important to understand the relation between 
intelligence and other factors that influence education, health, and well-being, and design 
individualized interventions in practical settings. The development and validation of a public-
domain cognitive ability resource will facilitate the advancement of research in these areas. For a 
brief review of the literature on several broad areas of research informed by cognitive abilities, 
and how they could benefit from access to public-domain measurement tools, see Appendix A.  
The following chapter provides context for the validation of a public domain measure of 
cognitive abilities through comparison with a well-established, theory-based assessment. First, 
the rationale for and limitations of a public-domain measure, and a description of its first 
incarnation, the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR) is provided. A brief description 
the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model of cognitive abilities and how they are measured by the WAIS-
IV follows. Finally, construct validity of psychological measures and its evaluation in cross-
battery assessment is discussed. 
Accessible Cognitive Ability Measures for Researchers  
In their introduction of the ICAR, Condon and Revelle (2014) presented several reasons 
the extant toolkit of proprietary cognitive assessments is not ideal for the purposes of primary 
researchers, including differences in score interpretation, test content, and administrative 
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flexibility needs. First, the authors argued that though the quality of data is essential, primary 
researchers are typically not concerned with providing feedback to examinees. While examinees 
in clinical and selection settings have a principal interest in test results and their interpretation, 
participants in research studies may be motivated by monetary rewards, course credit, or other 
small incentives (Brase, 2009). Thus, commercial measures that emphasize the interpretive 
potential of their products are misapplied and inefficient in primary research contexts.  
 In addition, Condon and Revelle (2014) noted the test content and organization of 
existing measures is often not optimal for the needs of primary researchers. Most test companies 
distribute their measures as full kits that include a fixed battery of measures (“Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt,” 2017; “Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, Second Edition,” 2017; “Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children®-Fifth Edition,” 2017). Almost no batteries contain a sufficient 
number of tests to measure all of the abilities associated with intelligence (Alfonso, Flanagan, & 
Radwan, 2005). A researcher interested in measuring a wide variety of cognitive constructs may 
need to administer tests from several different commercial measures. Alternatively, a researcher 
interested in only one construct may need to purchase an entire kit, or multiple kits, to access 
appropriate measures of the construct of interest.   
 The logistical and practical aspects of administering proprietary measures may pose the 
most salient barriers to their use in primary research. Practical considerations of accessing 
proprietary measures include, but are not limited to, the financial cost of the measure and scoring 
materials (Yates & Taub, 2003), the time needed to administer and score assessments (Camara et 
al., 2000), requisite training level of administrators (Alfonso, Johnson, Patinella, & Rader, 1998; 
Mrazik, Janzen, Dombrowski, Barford, & Krawchuk, 2012), and privacy and security of testing 
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and storage spaces (Kaufmann, 2009). Although these considerations may be superficial, they 
have the potential to burden research progress.  
As budgets for research in the social sciences tend to be relatively small compared to 
other fields (National Science Foundation, 2017), the cost of measures is a substantial 
consideration for researchers in these areas. The financial cost of proprietary assessments for 
researchers varies, but most commercial test kits cost hundreds to thousands of dollars 
(“Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,” 2017, “Pearson Clinical,” 2017, “WPS,” 2017). In addition to the 
cost of the assessment materials, the cost of trained administrators, appropriate testing spaces, 
scoring and interpretation time, and clinical supervision inflate the price of administering 
commercial measures substantially. For example, Yates and Taub (2003) estimated the cost of 
administering just one WISC-V and a child behavior checklist (CBCL) to be up to $700 per child 
when all expenses are considered. Though some testing companies offer reduced-rates to 
qualified research groups, relatively few proprietary measures are freely available to researchers 
(Condon & Revelle, 2014).  
The most widely used freely-available measure of cognitive abilities in psychological 
research is the Educational Testing Services (ETS) Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests. 
The current version of the kit was published in 1976, and has since been used in hundreds of 
studies (Babcock & Laguna, 1997; Ekstrom & Bejar, 1990), however, the ETS Kit poses several 
significant disadvantages to researchers as well. First, though the test is widely used in research, 
little research has been conducted on the psychometric properties of the measure. In one of the 
few studies examining the kit, Babcock and Laguna (1997) found a three-factor solution that was 
inconsistent with the four constructs ETS claimed the kit measured. The authors concluded that 
the measure should be used with caution in research and suggested it should not serve as the 
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standard against which other tests are compared. No studies to date have compared the ETS kit 
with a well-established measure of intelligence.  In contrast, commercial measures offer an 
extensive research base, as they are privately validated and have been a focus of independent 
intelligence researchers as well (e.g. Flanagan & Alfonso, 2016; Keith, Low, Reynolds, Patel, & 
Ridley, 2010; McGrew, 2009; Weiss et al., 2013). Thus, primary researchers may have to 
compromise test validity for cost at the expensive of quality research findings.  
Direct costs are not the only limiting factor to consider in research; time and training are 
also imperatives in the implementation of research studies. Common batteries require one-to-one 
administration for more than one hour, followed by an additional 10 to 20 min for scoring 
(Camara et al., 2000). Furthermore, standardized administration by a trained professional 
(typically a masters-level clinician or above) is imperative in order to preserve the validity of the 
measures and obtain accurate results (Mrazik et al., 2012; Styck & Walsh, 2016). Aside from the 
costs associated with using trained administrators, the time required to recruit and train such 
administrators for large samples can be an obstacle in itself. For example, Alfonso and 
colleagues recommended that students complete five to six administrations before they are 
competent to administer a valid assessment using the WISC-III (Alfonso et al., 1998). The 
amount of time to train and supervise administrators is a sizeable obstacle to commercial test use 
in large studies.   
Issues of secure testing and storage space may also be a barrier to the use of proprietary 
measures in research. Material test kits are physically cumbersome and require secure storage 
spaces for safe keeping. Federal courts require the protection of psychological tests as a unique 
methodology, and some states mandate the safeguarding of test materials (Kaufmann, 2009). 
This means researchers must have locations with adequate security to store materials. 
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Furthermore, valid administration of most traditional cognitive assessments requires the use of 
private, distraction-free testing spaces (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006). These logistical 
challenges may increase the likelihood of researchers ignoring cognitive abilities in their work 
completely.  
Group intelligence assessments offer a partial solution to some of the limitations posed 
by individual tests. Popular group tests such as the Cognitive Abilities Test (CogAT; Lohman et 
al., 2001), the Cattell Culture-Fair Intelligence Test (CCFIT; Cattell & Cattell, 1960), Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices (RPM; Raven, 1998), the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT; Donlon, 1984), 
among many others, can assess large groups of individuals simultaneously without the need for 
private test spaces, highly trained administrators, or complex scoring systems (Motta & Joseph, 
2000). Group tests of cognitive abilities tend to be relatively more economical than individual 
assessment (Motta & Joseph, 2000), yet the vast majority are still proprietary measures; primary 
researchers cannot readily access these measures without going through the proper channels and 
paying associated fees. Albeit to a lesser extent than individual measures, proprietary group tests 
present many of the same financial, test security, and logistical concerns to primary researchers 
as proprietary individual assessments.  
One emerging solution to the accessibility problem in cognitive ability research is the 
National Institute of Health’s (NIH) Toolbox. The aim of the NIH common on set of assessment 
tools that can be used across populations and disciplines to measure cognitive, emotional, 
sensory, and motor health from ages 3–85 years (Bauer & Zelazo, 2013).  The NIH Toolbox is 
also available at a low cost to researchers, and has been well-validated across child, adult, and 
clinical populations (Akshoomoff et al., 2014; Hessl et al., 2016; Mungas et al., 2013; Weintraub 
et al., 2014).  
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Despite the benefits of the NIH Toolbox for researchers, there are a few areas in which it 
is lacking in ease of accessibility in comparison to the ICAR. First, albeit at a much lower cost 
than most commercial measures, the cognitive battery is not completely free of charge 
(Akshoomoff et al., 2013). Second, trained administrators are still necessary to give the cognitive 
battery on iPads or on paper, contrary to the ICAR which is self-administered over the web. 
Finally, the battery is fixed, unlike the ICAR which encourages researchers to create their own 
items and validate them against the existing battery. Thus, the NIH Toolbox in its current form 
has more potential for use in clinical settings, while the ICAR remains a more flexible and 
accessible tool for research.  
Barriers to access to cognitive assessment materials in primary research may have wide-
spread consequences. Some scholars have suggested that dependence on proprietary measures 
has slowed scientific progress in the field of psychology (Gambardella & Hall, 2006; Goldberg, 
1999; Liao, Armstrong, & Rounds, 2008). Almost two decades ago, Goldberg (1999) proposed 
that policies and practices of commercial test publishers who prioritize their financial interests 
over scientific advancement hindered progress in the field of personality psychology. In 
response, Goldberg developed the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), an internet-based 
resource to provide easy access to measures of individual differences and foster collaboration 
between researchers (Goldberg et al., 2006). The IPIP has been found to be more efficient for use 
in research settings when compared to some proprietary personality measures, and also 
demonstrated higher reliability than the most commonly used commercial measures (Hamby, 
Taylor, Snowden, & Peterson, 2016). Success with a public-domain collection of personality 
data along with the challenges of using proprietary cognitive measures has encouraged 
researchers to explore a similar type of resource for cognitive ability measurement.  
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The International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR) 
Condon and Revelle (2014) developed the International Cognitive Ability Resource 
(ICAR) with the goal of providing a free, online assessment tool to researchers in the social 
sciences and encourage the integration of neuropsychological assessment into medical research 
and practice. In their initial analysis of the ICAR items, Condon and Revelle (2014) assessed 
four distinct but related tasks, and provided evidence of sound psychometric properties for the 
items (Condon & Revelle, 2016). The respective multiple choice item types ask participants to 
identify: the missing element in a pattern of digit or letter combinations (Letter Number Series, 
LN, 9 items), the missing shape in a 3x3 array of geometric shapes (Matrix Reasoning, MR-I, 11 
items), the correct response to a variety of logic questions and math word problems (Verbal 
Reasoning, VR, 16 items), and the response choice that is a possible rotation of a stimulus figure 
(Three-dimensional Rotation 3DR, 24 items) (Condon & Revelle, 2014). All of the items are 
available for qualified researchers upon request, and the authors published a 16-item sample test, 
the ICAR16, which was validated concurrently with the longer version.  
Condon and Revelle (2014) conducted the initial validation of the ICAR items in 3 
studies. The first explored the item characteristics, reliability, and structural properties of the 
ICAR60 by distributing untimed random sets of 12 to 16 items to an online sample of 96,958 
individuals (66% female) ages 14 to 90 from 199 countries. Internal consistency for the item 
composites on the ICAR16 and the ICAR60 were adequate (α = .81; ωtotal = 0.83) and good (α = 
0.93; ωtotal = 0.94), respectively. There was substantial variability in the means and standard 
deviations of the ICAR items, which suggests that untimed, self-administration of the items 
online did not lead to uniformly high scores (i.e. cheating). This finding is important since one of 
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the main concerns about the development of a public domain measure is that lack of copyright 
protection will threaten validity (Goldberg et al., 2006).  
One of the stated goals in the development of the ICAR items was to avoid item content 
that could be readily referenced elsewhere, in order to prevent the temptation to search for 
answers on the internet in an unproctored setting (Condon & Revelle, 2014). In addition to 
sufficient variability in responses, the item information functions demonstrated a wide range of 
item difficulties, which suggests that examinees were unable to look up answers easily. The item 
information functions for the ICAR16 demonstrated adequate reliability across a range of ability 
levels, most appropriate within 1.5 standard deviations from the mean item difficulty.  
The structural properties of the ICAR16 and the ICAR60 were evaluated in Study 1 as 
well. An exploratory factor analysis revealed a four-factor solution that fit the data well 
(RMSEA = 0.014, RMSR = 0.01, TLI = 0.99), with each item type represented by a different 
factor, and with relatively small cross-loadings (Condon & Revelle, 2014). The item loadings on 
the primary factors ranged from .2 to .7, and the factor loadings on the general factor were .5 for 
3DR, .8 for LN, .8 for VR, and .7 for MR (Condon & Revelle, 2014). Though the four factors are 
associated directly with the respective item types, the authors did not name what the latent 
factors supposedly measure. That is, though the item types load onto distinct factors, these 
factors are more of a reflection of the cohesion of the item types rather than the underlying 
cognitive abilities involved. Thus, it is unclear which cognitive abilities are being assessed by the 
items.  
Construct validity of the ICAR items was evaluated indirectly by comparison with the 
Shipley-2, a brief, self-administered assessment of crystallized ability and fluid cognitive ability 
(Shipley, Gruber, & Martin, 2009). The Shipley-2 measures cognitive ability using three subtests 
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that compose two composite scores: Composite A consists of Vocabulary and Abstraction, and 
Composite B consists of Vocabulary and Block Patterns. Condon and Revelle (2014) reported 
that, after correction for restriction of range and reliability, the correlations between the ICAR16 
and Shipley-2 Composites  (ICAR16 and Composite A, r=.82; ICAR16 and Composite B, r=.81), 
were similar to those of the Shipley-2 composites and other tests of cognitive abilities. 
Though psychometric data has been reviewed for the Shipley-2 and deemed adequate 
(Kaya, Delen, & Bulut, 2012), it does not have a strong independent research base relative to 
more widely-used measures of intelligence (Reynolds et al., 2016). The construct validity of the 
Shipley-2 has been called into question in recent work (Beaujean et al., 2017; Reynolds et al., 
2016). Based on a comparative analysis of the Shipley-2 and the WISC-IV, Reynolds and 
colleagues (2016) concluded that the Shipley-2 composites should not be interpreted as strong 
indicators of psychometric g for children and adolescents. Beaujean and colleagues (2017) also 
advised caution with the Shipley-2 after finding that the Block Patterns subtest did not measure a 
unitary construct. Aside from concerns about the reference measure, Condon and Revelle (2014) 
only provided correlations between the ICAR16 total score and the Shipley-2 Composites scores. 
They did not report correlations between specific ICAR item types and Shipley-2 subtest scores, 
nor did they report variance explained by a general factor. Thus, further evidence of the construct 
validity of the ICAR16 is needed.   
A comparison study of the ICAR16 with a well-established measure of intelligence 
grounded in CHC theory is necessary in order to attain a level of confidence in the appropriate 
uses for the tool (Woodcock, 1990). Cross-battery analysis of data will help elucidate the 
relationship between the ICAR16 item types and various cognitive abilities and psychometric g 
(Reynolds, Keith, Flanagan, & Alfonso, 2013). Though comparison with a well-studied measure 
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is necessary, it is important to note that the nature of the ICAR is different than traditional 
measures by design, and thus limitations are inherent in its use.  
A brief, online, self-administered, and untimed test is less precise and exhaustive than 
traditional comprehensive assessment (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2001). The ICAR is not intended 
for clinical or diagnostic purposes (Condon & Revelle, 2014). The ICAR lacks both standardized 
administration and interpretable results in a clinical setting. Furthermore, by design, the system 
does not include behavioral observations from trained clinicians, which is essential to clinical 
evaluation and decision-making (Oakland, Glutting, & Watkins, 2005; Sattler, 2008). 
Conversely, the limitations of the ICAR to the clinician present as strengths to the primary 
researcher--it is time and cost efficient, relatively easy to use for both researchers and 
participants, and facilitates efficient data collection and analysis.  
From the perspective of the primary researcher, the main limitation of the current version 
of the ICAR items is the paucity of independent research using the measure. In order for the 
measure to be used with confidence, the constructs measured by the ICAR must be understood in 
the context of current theories. The following section briefly discusses the current prevailing 
theory, the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory of cognitive abilities, and how the associated 
constructs are measured by the WAIS-IV.  
Contemporary Intelligence Theory  
Despite centuries of interest in the nature and measurement of human cognitive abilities, 
there continues to be no consensus on a unified definition of intelligence (Legg & Hutter, 2007; 
Neisser et al., 1996; Sternberg & Detterman, 1986). The historical context of the development of 
theories of intelligence is extensive and wrought with controversy, and thus is important to bear 
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in mind throughout the development and validation of new intelligence measures. A brief 
comment on the historical and cultural context of these theories is provided in Appendix G.  
Though there are several working theories in the literature (see Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 
1994; Gardner, 1987; Johnson & Bouchard, 2005), Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory has come to be 
the most popular and well-researched theory of cognitive abilities today (Flanagan & Harrison, 
2012; Keith & Reynolds, 2010; McGrew, 2005, 2009), and thus is the focus of the remainder of 
this section. 
Cattell-Horn-Carroll Theory 
 In a 1957 letter to John Carroll, Raymond Cattell compared the creation of a 
standardized taxonomy of cognitive abilities in the field of psychology to the fixing of the 
standard meter in physics, or the calibration of atomic weights in chemistry (McGrew, 2009). 
The field’s own standardization began to emerge in the literature decades later, when Carroll 
(1993) published Human Cognitive Abilities: A Survey of Factor-Analytic Studies. Carroll’s 
seminal meta-analysis provided the first comprehensive, empirically-based, systematic 
organization of the structure of human cognitive abilities in a unified framework (McGrew, 
2009). Carroll ́s model represents a hierarchical, three-stratum organization of human abilities 
based on factor analytic research, with stratum I consisting of narrow abilities, stratum II 
consisting of broad abilities, and stratum III consisting of a single general ability factor, g 
(Carroll, 1993).  
 Several decades prior, the Cattell-Horn’s Gf-Gc Theory used second-order factor analysis 
to identify two broad intelligence factors: fluid ability (Gf), which represented biologically based 
reasoning abilities, and crystallized intelligence (Gc), which represented acquired knowledge 
(Horn & Cattell, 1966). The theory evolved to incorporate a more diverse range of broad abilities 
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to adequately account for the breadth of human abilities, though never adopted the third-order 
general intelligence factor (Horn & Blankson, 2005). The presence or absence of a general factor 
of intelligence remained the main distinction between Cattell-Horn Gf-Gc theory and Carroll’s 
three-stratum theory; otherwise, the theories share more in common than not (Alfonso et al., 
2005). Because of similarities between the two models, the Cattell-Horn Gf-Gc theory was 
integrated with Carroll's three-stratum theory to form what is now the most widely accepted 
model of human intelligence, Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory (Alfonso et al., 2005; Keith & 
Reynolds, 2010; McGrew, 2009; W. Schneider & McGrew, 2012).  
 The broad abilities presented in stratum II of CHC theory are important in understanding 
the influence of cognitive abilities and their measurement. Several studies have provided 
evidence that the influence of g on achievement is mediated through the broad abilities, and that 
some broad abilities influence achievement over and above the effect of g (Floyd, McGrew, & 
Evans, 2008; Keith, 1999; Taub et al., 2008; Vanderwood, McGrew, Flanagan, & Keith, 2002). 
McGrew (2009) describes 16 broad abilities involved in CHC model, six of which are 
“tentatively defined” due to their sensorial/kinesthetic rather than purely cognitive nature 
(Danthiir, Roberts, Pallier, & Stankov, 2001; McGrew, 2009). Most practical applications of 
CHC theory address up to nine broad abilities: fluid intelligence (Gf), crystallized intelligence or 
verbal-comprehension (Gc), visual-spatial ability (Gv), auditory processing (Ga), short-term 
memory (Gsm), long-term retrieval (Glr), processing speed (Gs), quantitative knowledge (Gq), 
reading and writing Grw) (McGrew, 2009). For descriptions of all nine of these broad abilities, 
see Appendix G.   
 Currently, no single cognitive battery measures the full breadth of the CHC abilities 
(Alfonso et al., 2005). Different batteries serve distinct purposes and measure different 
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constructs. Because of the self-administered nature of the ICAR, certain abilities such as writing, 
auditory cognition, processing speed, and long-term memory are not feasibly assessed. Thus, 
only broad abilities that are reasonably assessed by the ICAR and the WAIS-IV, including Gf, 
Gsm, Gv, Gc, and Gs, are relevant to the scope of this paper. CHC-based perspectives on the 
broad abilities and common approaches to their measurement is briefly discussed in the 
following section.   
Fluid Intelligence (Gf). McGrew (2009) defines Gf as the use of deliberate and controlled 
mental operations to solve novel problems. Gf is of particular interest to test developers because 
of its strong relation to g. There is some empirical and theoretical evidence of the equivalence of 
Gf to g (Gustafsson, 1984, 1988, 2002; Reynolds & Keith, 2007; Undheim & Gustafsson, 1987), 
but other research has conflicted with this notion as well (Blair, 2006; Gignac, 2014, 2015). 
Disagreement over the interchangeability of Gf and g may be reconciled to an extent by Cattell’s 
Investment theory (1987). Investment theory asserts that Gf reflects a neurobiological ability to 
perceive abstract and concrete relations, and is responsible in part for the acquisition of 
knowledge and skills (Cattell, 1987; Kvist & Gustafsson, 2008). Evidence from neuroimaging 
studies suggests that Gf is more biologically rooted in the brain relative to other broad abilities 
(Bigler et al., 1995; Gong et al., 2005). Furthermore, Kvist and Gustafsson (2008) found that g 
and Gf were equivalent within populations that had equal opportunities to learn, but 
demonstrated a weaker association in heterogeneously educated populations. Through this 
perspective, Gf can be viewed as the aptitude to learn within a given environment, which drives 
the development of other areas of ability.  
According to McGrew and Evans (2004), fluid intelligence is comprised of five stratum I 
abilities: General Sequential Reasoning (i.e. the ability to apply a given set of rules to solve a 
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problem; RG), Induction (i.e. the ability to discover underlying rules from a given set of 
observations; I), Quantitative Reasoning (i.e. the ability to use reasoning in regards to numerical 
relations; RQ), Piagetian Reasoning (i.e. the ability to use apply cognitive concepts defined by 
Piagetian developmental theory; RP), and Speed of Reasoning (i.e. the speed with which one can 
apply reasoning skills; RE). Of these narrow abilities, quantitative reasoning (RQ), induction (I), 
and deduction (RG) are most commonly measured in cognitive assessments (Carroll, 1993). 
Wilhelm (2005) observed that deductive reasoning tends to be measured by verbal stimuli, while 
inductive reasoning tends to be measured by figural-spatial stimuli, and quantitative reasoning 
tends to be measured using numerical stimuli. Some researchers have suggested that depending 
on the nature of the task, tests of these narrow abilities may be influenced by other broad 
abilities, like Gv or Gc (Waschl, Nettelbeck, Jackson, & Burns, 2016; Wilhelm, 2005). Still, 
Carroll (1993) found that measures of inductive reasoning tend to be the most representative of 
Gf.  
Both Cattell (1971)and Carroll (1993) observed that the best tests of general intelligence 
involve tests of Gf, and most short-form measures of intelligence focus on measuring Gf (e.g. 
Johnsen, 2017; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990; Shipley, 2009;  Wechsler, 1999). Some well-
established and widely-used propriety tests use a single task, typically inductive reasoning tasks 
such as matrices or pattern recognition, to measure Gf (e.g.  Cattell & Cattell, 1960; Raven, 
1998). Most long-form proprietary cognitive batteries measure Gf through multiple non-verbal 
tests or tests of abstraction in order to avoid task-specific variance (e.g. Elliott, 2007; Schrank et 
al., 2014; Wechsler, 2014). These tests typically involve at least one matrices or pattern-
recognition-type task. The content of the ICAR items (i.e. pattern recognition through a variety 
of stimuli) suggests that Gf is the primary focus of the test.  
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Short-term Memory (Gsm).  McGrew (2009) defines Gsm as the ability to apprehend and 
maintain awareness of a limited number of elements of information in the immediate situation.  
The Gsm broad ability is comprised by two distinct narrow abilities, Memory Span (i.e. the 
ability to attend to and immediately recall presented information; MS), and Working Memory 
(i.e. the ability to mentally hold and manipulate information while performing some mental 
operation; MW) (McGrew & Evans, 2004). MS is thought to demand less mental resources than 
MW, which has been supported by empirical data (Kail & Hall, 2001; Reynolds, 1997). In fact, 
MW is thought to be an essential influence on Gf, and contributes substantially to general 
intelligence (Gignac, 2014). Unlike MS, psychometric evidence suggests MW measures 
represent a factorially complex mixture of abilities rather than a cohesive latent factor (Carroll, 
1993; McGrew & Evans, 2004). The MW is included among the narrow abilities because of the 
theoretical and experimental evidence of its existence (Kyllonen & Dennis, 1996; McGrew & 
Evans, 2004). McGrew and Evans (2004) integrate components of the most-widely accepted 
theoretical model of working memory, the Baddeley model, in the CHC definition of MW 
(Leffard et al., 2006). These components include the phonological loop, which processes verbal 
and auditory information, the visual spatial sketchpad, which processes visual and spatial 
information, and the central executive system that directs resources between the two systems 
(Baddeley, 2001; McGrew & Evans, 2004).  
Different types of tasks are thought to measure the various components of short term 
memory. Simple span tasks, such as repeating a series of digits in order, are typically thought to 
be good measures of MS (Leffard et al., 2006; C. R. Reynolds, 1997). These types of tasks are 
not measured on the ICAR in its current version but could be measured by automated computer 
systems. MW by nature is more complex to measure. Tasks that require some mental 
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transformation of information are typically included in working memory composites, such as 
sequencing a series of digits or letters or reciting the series backward (Leffard et al., 2006).  
Mental problem solving of verbally presented problems may measure Gsm. Some four-
factor models of the Wechsler scales suggest that the Arithmetic task loads onto the  Gsm  factor 
(Keith, Fine, Taub, Reynolds, & Kranzler, 2006; Wechsler, 2008; Weiss et al., 2013), however, 
at least one model found Arithmetic is a better measure of Quantitative Knowledge (Gq) and 
Processing Speed (Gs) than Gsm (Phelps, McGrew, Knopik, & Ford, 2005), and many other 
models have found it to be a better indicator of Gf (Keith et al., 2006; Niileksela et al., 2013; 
Weiss et al., 2013). Keith and colleagues (2006) suggested that the task calls upon a diverse set 
of abilities (Keith & Reynolds, 2010). It is unclear the extent to which the working memory 
skills involved in the Arithmetic are method-specific. That is, it is unlikely the role of working 
memory would be if the same problems from the Arithmetic subtests were self-administered 
(like in the ICAR) rather than administered orally (like in the WAIS-IV), as this eliminates the 
need for mental calculations. 
Visual-Spatial Ability. McGrew and Evans (2004) define Gv as the ability to generate, 
store, retrieve, and transform visual images and tactile sensations. Gv abilities are included in 
almost every model of intelligence, yet their predictive power in terms of achievement outcomes 
tends to be overshadowed by other abilities such as Gf and Gc (Lohman, 1996). Gv represents a 
collection of ten narrow abilities, that involve the mental manipulation of objects (VZ, SR), 
ability to identify visual forms among distracting visual information (CS, CF, SS), mental 
estimation of spatial distances (LE), or the ability to perceive and depict abstract visual 
information (IL, PM, IM). Though Gv abilities are not strong predictors of academic success, 
some have argued they are less reliable measures of psychometric g (Lohman, 1996; Spearman 
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& Jones, 1950). Spatial ability measures are gaining interest as indicators of creativity, success in 
gifted identification, and aptitude in STEM careers (Andersen, 2014; Wai, Lubinski, & Benbow, 
2009). 
 Lohman (1996) identifies four different methods for measuring spatial abilities: 
performance tests, paper-and-pencil tests, verbal tests, and dynamic computer based tests. 
Performance tests such as block manipulation, and paper-and-pencil tests, such as paper folding 
tasks, are among the earliest measures of spatial intelligence and still used in contemporary 
cognitive batteries (Lohman, 1996). Factor-analyses of large data sets from paper-and-pencil 
measures have revealed five distinct factors measured by these types of tests (Carroll, 1993; 
Lohman, 1979), and thus it is recommended that multiple tests are used to measure the construct. 
Verbal-Comprehension Knowledge (Crystallized Intelligence) (Gc).  Horn described Gc 
as cultural knowledge acquired through the process of acculturation (Horn, 1991). According to 
McGrew and Evans (2004), Gc is primarily language-based declarative and procedural 
knowledge acquired through the application of other abilities in educational and other 
experiences. Narrow abilities include areas such as language development (LD), lexical 
knowledge (VL), listening ability (LS), content knowledge (K0, K2), communication skills (CM, 
OP, MY), and foreign language skills (KL, LA). Most major tests of intellectual ability contain 
some verbal assessment, and verbal comprehension is thought to be an important indicator of g 
(Sternberg & Powell, 1983). In fact, verbal subtests have been found to be one of the best 
indicators of general intelligence (Gignac, 2006; Robinson, 1999), and Gc is the only ability that 
does not deteriorate with age (Salthouse, 2009). Verbal subtests are often thought to decrease the 
cultural fairness of tests, though cross-cultural research has demonstrated that non-verbal tests 
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can be culturally biased as well (Rosselli & Ardila, 2003). Despite lingering cultural concerns, 
verbal subtests remain a staple of contemporary intelligence batteries.  
Gc is most often directly measured by tests of vocabulary, reading comprehension, and 
cultural information (Sternberg & Powell, 1983). Given the verbal nature of many tests, there is 
evidence Gc may also indirectly influence performance on subtests that are not intended to 
measure verbal comprehension explicitly, such as Arithmetic (Keith et al., 2006; Weiss et al., 
2013). Measuring verbal comprehension becomes more challenging in self-administered online 
formats since vocabulary and cultural information is easily searched on the internet. This should 
be considered in the development and evaluation of online public domain assessments of Gc. 
Processing Speed (Gs).  McGrew and Evans (2004) define Gs as the ability to 
automatically and fluently perform simple or over-learned cognitive tasks, especially when a 
high degree of focused attention is required. The narrow abilities associated with Gs include 
perceptual Speed (P), Number Facility (N), Reading Speed (RS), Writing Speed (WS) and Rate-
of-Test-Taking (R9). Gs is considered a more discrete domain of cognitive functioning relative 
to other broad abilities that are considered to be “higher-order” such as Gf and Gc (Borghesani et 
al., 2013; Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Wechsler, 2008). Although 
Gs tends to demonstrate a lesser relation with g relative to other broad abilities, there is evidence 
that Gs is a neurologically-based foundation upon which more complex abilities are developed 
(Fry & Hale, 1996; Kail, 2000). Along with Gsm, Gs tends to be substantially impaired among 
neurologically compromised individuals, to the extent that estimates of general intelligence are 
often calculated without these scores for clinical populations (A. G. Harrison, DeLisle, & Parker, 
2008). It follows that discrepancies between Gs and higher order ability scores can be indications 
of neuropsychopathology (Lichtenberger & Kaufman, 2009).  
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 Measures of Gs involve different types of rote perceptual, motor, or cognitive tasks, and 
various degrees of motor speed and agility (Kail, 2000). Although Gs may indirectly influence 
performance on a range of different types of intelligence tasks, direct measures of processing 
speed are timed tasks (Kail, 2000; Vernon, 1983). It is unreasonable to expect that a self-
administered untimed task is a direct measure of Gs. Thus, the subtests that measure Gs on the 
WAIS-IV are used as a point of discriminant validity of the ICAR items.  
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales--Fourth Edition.  
The Wechsler scales are among the most well-established and commonly used measures 
of cognitive abilities (Alfonso et al., 2005; Lichtenberger & Kaufman, 2009). Since the release of 
the fourth edition of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, a substantial amount of research has 
been conducted on its factor structure, including several studies grounded in CHC theory 
(Benson et al., 2010; Niileksela et al., 2013; Schneider & McGrew, 2012; Ward, Bergman, & 
Hebert, 2012; Weiss et al., 2013). The WAIS-IV Technical and Interpretive Manual reports a 
number of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) that support a four-factor structure of the test 
norming data. The four index scores, the Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI), the Perceptual 
Reasoning Index (PRI), the Processing Speed Index (PSI), and the Working Memory Index 
(WMI), are derived from these factors (Wechsler, 2008). At least two independent analyses of 
the WAIS-IV have also supported the four-factor structure, including Canivez and Watkins 
(2010) and Ward, Bergman, and Herbert (2012), but through divergent perspectives. Ward and 
colleagues used cognitive theory to help specify and interpret their models, while Canivez and 
Watkins argued for a bi-factor approach in which the second-order g-factor is the primary focus 
of interpretation. Four-factor models have some empirical support but deviate slightly from CHC 
theory in that they tend to combine the broad abilities of Gf and Gv.   
 
 56 
Perhaps the most notable study of the structure of the WAIS-IV is by Weiss and 
colleagues (2013), which was featured along with eight commentaries in a special issue of the 
Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment dedicated the fourth editions of the Wechsler Scales, 
Weiss and colleagues (2013) found that based on all 15 WAIS-IV subtests, both four- and five-
factor models fit the data, but the five-factor model provided a better fit. The five-factor model 
differentiated the combined Gf/Gv factor (“Perceptual Reasoning”) cited in the WAIS-IV 
technical manual into separate Gf and Gv latent factors, which fit the data better and was more 
consistent with CHC theory (Weiss et al., 2013). In the five-factor model, Block Design, Picture 
Completion, and Visual Puzzles loaded on the Gv factor while Matrix Reasoning, Figure 
Weights, and Arithmetic loaded on to the Gf factor. This interpretation is supported by the work 
of Benson and colleagues (2010), who also found that a five-factor CHC-based structure fit the 
data better than the four-factor structure offered by the test developers.  
Weiss and colleagues’ models provide evidence that the 15 subtest WAIS-IV is a valid 
measure of five CHC broad abilities, however, most examiners do not administer all of these 
subtests in practice, and they are not administered to examinees aged 70 to 90. To remedy this 
problem, Niileksela and colleagues (2013) found a CHC-based five-factor alternative solution 
using just the ten core subtests. The authors achieved this solution by allowing the three-digit 
span tasks (digits forward, digits backward, and digit sequencing) to load as three separate 
indicators on the Gsm latent factor while Arithmetic and Matrix Reasoning loaded on the Gf 
factor. This solution fit the data well and provides evidence of construct validity for core battery 
of WAIS-IV subtests according to CHC theory (Niileksela et al., 2013). The separation of the 
digits forward, digits backward, and digit sequencing subtasks has been supported by a number 
of studies using factor-analytic and brain imaging techniques (Gerton et al., 2004; Griffin & 
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Heffernan, 1983; Reynolds, 1997; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). Otherwise, the model was fairly 
consistent with the five-factor model by Weiss and colleagues (2013). 
Lichtenberger and Kaufman (2009, 2012) offer an interpretive system for the full battery 
and the 10 subtest core battery based on a five-factor model by Keith (2009), which is congruent 
with the predominant five-factor models in the literature (i.e. Niileksela et al., 2013, and Weiss et 
al., 2013). The interpretive system offers two options for calculating estimates of the broad 
ability factor scores, referred to as Broad Ability Composite (BAC) scores. Both versions 
calculate broad ability estimates by summing the scores on two related subtests, respectively, 
however, the Keith Five-Factor model is based on the use of Letter-Number Sequencing and 
Figure Weights, and the Core Five-Factor model excludes those two subtests and relies 
exclusively on the core battery (Table 6). This system of interpretation allows for association of 
subtest data with CHC constructs when factor analysis of large sets of data is not possible.  For 
this reason, the Core Five-Factor Model interpretation was used to associate subtest data with 
CHC broad abilities in subsequent analyses.  
Summary. The Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory of cognitive abilities is the best researched 
and most widely accepted model of human intelligence in the literature today. Most 
contemporary tests of cognitive abilities are guided by CHC theory. The broad abilities in 
stratum II of Carroll’s three stratum model are of particular importance to understanding the 
influence of intelligence. Though each broad ability plays an important role, five broad abilities 
including Gf, Gv, Gsm, Gc, and Gs are consistently measured on test batteries and are relevant to 
the cross-battery examination of the WAIS-IV and the ICAR. Research suggests the WAIS-IV 
measures these five broad abilities well. Estimates of the CHC broad abilities from individual 
subtest scores can be computed using the interpretive system presented by Lichtenberger and 
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Kaufman (2012) when factor scores cannot be calculated. Taken together, the WAIS-IV provides 
a reasonable CHC-based reference with which to compare the ICAR.  
Evaluating Construct Validity of Cognitive Assessments 
 A large body of work has been dedicated to determining what constitutes evidence of 
construct validity in psychological measurement (Cronbach, 1988, 1989; Foster & Cone, 1995; 
Messick, 1979).  In simple terms, the construct validity of a test is the extent to which a test 
measures what it is intended to measure (Anastasi, 1968). One approach to investigating the 
constructs measured by a new test is to compare it to another test with well-known properties 
(Woodcock, 1990). In cross-battery comparisons, construct validity is supported by evidence of 
convergent validity and discriminant validity, that is, tests demonstrate a strong relation to other 
tests of the same construct and are unrelated to tests of distinct constructs (Campbell & Fiske, 
1959). In 1959, Campbell and Fiske published a seminal article that presented one of the earliest 
systematic methods for evaluating convergent and divergent validity of psychological measures: 
the multitrait multimethod matrix (MTMM) analysis. In order to demonstrate evidence of 
convergent and divergent validity in an MTMM analysis, different measures of the same trait 
(monotrait, heteromethod) should demonstrate high correlations, while correlations between 
measures of distinct traits (heterotrait, monomethod, and heterotrait, heteromethod) should be 
relatively lower (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).  
 Despite the massive influence of the work of Campbell and Fiske in the development of 
psychometric standards in psychology (Sternberg, 1992), numerous authors have identified 
limitations to their MTMM analytic method (see Schmitt & Stults, 1986), including Campbell 
and Fiske themselves (Fiske & Campbell, 1992). One of the primary problems with the method 
is that it is qualitative in nature and based on a visual comparison of patterns of correlations, thus 
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the degree to which convergence/divergence criteria are met cannot be quantified (Lowe & 
Ryan-Wenger, 1992). Method and error variance are not feasibly separated via visual inspection, 
thus the relative contributions of error and method variance are unclear (Campbell & O’Connell, 
1982).   
 Advances in technology over the last 50 years have provided alternatives to overcome the 
limitations posed by traditional MTMM methods. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of a 
MTMM tests if the hypothesized common trait and method factor structure is supported by the 
variance observed in the matrix (Wothke, 1996). This method is preferred for a number of 
reasons summarized by Lowe and Ryan-Wenger (1992). First, the model is able to estimate the 
trait and method factor loading, the interrelations, and the random errors for each of the 
variables. Second, the CFA approach is able to statistically test if the theoretical model is 
plausible given the observed data. Finally, the CFA is able to determine the relative contributions 
of the trait and method components and remove random error by testing inferences on latent 
variables rather than observed variables. In this approach, convergent validity is inferred from 
the loadings of the observed variables on to their respective trait factors, while discriminant 
validity is supported by near-zero interrelations among distinct latent trait variables (Lowe & 
Ryan-Wenger, 1992).  
 Though the advantages of CFA approaches to MMTM evaluation are compelling from a 
methodological perspective, there are several limitations which make these methods difficult to 
implement in practice. In order for the model to be identified, a minimum of three traits must be 
measured by three distinct methods. Additional measures increase study expense, time, and 
subject demand (Lowe & Ryan-Wenger, 1992). In addition, CFA approaches to MTMM require 
large sample sizes for even minimally complex models (N ~ 250) (Nussbeck, Eid, & Lischetzke, 
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2006). Collecting samples of this magnitude in most applied settings is impractical within a 
reasonable timeline due to the limitations of the extant cognitive assessment toolkit outlined in 
the Integrative Analysis section of this paper. For these reasons, as well as sample quality, the 
vast majority of intelligence researchers use the nationally normed standardization samples of 
commercial tests products (McGrew & Wendling, 2010). Standardization samples present many 
advantages for generalizability but the test companies who sponsor the data collection determine 
which assessments are administered, which presents a challenge to cross-battery analysis with 
independent measures.  
Planned missingness (PM) designs that use small samples of researcher-collected, full-
case data to link large, representative standardization samples may be an alternative to 
independently collecting large amounts of data (Garnier-Villarreal, Rhemtulla, & Little, 2014; 
Graham, Taylor, Olchowski, & Cumsille, 2006; Little & Rhemtulla, 2013). In the two-method 
measurement PM design, inexpensive, less valid measures and expensive, valid measures of the 
same construct are used simultaneously, with a small subsample of full cases (expensive and 
inexpensive measures) used to estimate missing information associated with a larger sample of 
partial cases (inexpensive measures only)(Graham et al., 2006). Though PM designs offer many 
advantages, several practical considerations must be considered before their implementation.  
First, though relatively fewer cases are needed for PM designs, a substantial number of 
full cases (N~100) are still necessary to ensure model convergence in most cases (Jia et al., 
2014). Even with a sufficient number of full cases, as in most confirmatory factor analysis, 
theory-guided models are specified a priori (Keith & Reynolds, 2012). In situations in which 
theoretical structure of measures are unclear, CFA model specifications are based on face 
validity and speculation alone. For example, the ICAR developers did not offer theoretical 
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explanations of the factors extracted from the data, so it is unclear which traits the test intends to 
measure and how many. Moreover, it is recommended that researchers collect small amounts to 
data to determine a priori if there are sufficiently high correlations between the measures to 
maximize the utility of PM two-method measurement designs (Olchowski, 2008). For small 
samples traditional methods are more feasible, and are still often implemented in healthcare 
research (Streiner, Norman, & Cairney, 2015). Correlational studies may serve as an 
intermediate step towards advanced statistical approaches, as long as the limitations of these 
methods are considered.  
Correlational analyses may be used to find preliminary evidence of construct validity, not 
confirm its existence. According to Cronbach (1989), “the Campbell and Fiske correlational 
check is not subtle. A substantial correlation of Trait 1 with Trait 2 does not make their 
distinction untenable; rather, the correlation puts the advocate under pressure to create conditions 
under which the variables pull apart” (pg. 154). Therefore, substantial and significant 
correlations between instruments designed to assess the same constructs are a necessary but not 
sufficient requirement to establish the validity of any psychological test (Fiske, 1971).  
Conclusion 
The extant tool kit of cognitive assessments lacks a validated instrument that is freely 
available to researchers across a variety of fields. Cognitive ability is an important construct that 
significantly predicts educational achievement, professional success, health outcomes, and well-
being (e.g. David Batty, Deary, & Gottfredson, 2007; Lager, Melin, Hemmingsson, & Sörberg 
Wallin, 2017; Roth et al., 2015; Schmidt & Hunter, 2004), yet it is often overlooked in primary 
research. Existing proprietary measures, while thoroughly validated and well-suited to clinical 
use, are not ideal for use in many primary research settings and may impede the measurement of 
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cognitive ability constructs in relevant areas of research. Access to cognitive ability 
measurement tools in the public domain will help facilitate research progress across the scientific 
community.  
 The International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR) is the first measure of its kind to be 
available in the public domain(Condon & Revelle, 2014). The ICAR was validated on a large 
sample of participants who completed the measure online, and demonstrates initial evidence of 
strong psychometric properties(Condon & Revelle, 2014). One of the main barriers to the 
usefulness of the ICAR in research is that no research to date has been conducted on its construct 
validity using a well-established, theoretically-guided cognitive battery.  
Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory is the most widely accepted model of human intelligence and 
serves as the common language for which intelligence researchers can communicate results 
(Alfonso et al., 2005; Keith & Reynolds, 2010, 2010; McGrew, 2009; Schneider & McGrew, 
2012). Most contemporary tests of intelligence are informed by CHC theory, including the 
WAIS-IV. The psychometric and theoretical properties of the WAIS-IV are well-established, and 
it consequently offers a useful point of reference to establish convergent and discriminant 




Appendix A: Normality Assumption Checks 
 




standardized_subtests<- select(WAISICAR, c("AR_SS", "MR_SS", "BD_SS", "VP_SS", "DS_SS", 
"DS_F_SS", "DS_B_SS", "DS_S_SS", "VC_SS", "SI_SS","IN_SS", "SS_SS", "CD_SS") ) 
 
 
colnames(standardized_subtests)<-c("Arithmetic", "Matrix Reasoning", "Block Design", "Visual 
Puzzles", "Digit Span Total Score", "Digit Span Forward", "Digit Span Backward", "Digit Span 
Sequencing", "Vocabulary", "Similarities", "Information","Symbol Search", "Coding") 
 
graph_wais_data_gathered<- standardized_subtests %>% select(c("Arithmetic", "Matrix 
Reasoning", "Block Design", "Visual Puzzles", "Digit Span Total Score", "Vocabulary", 
"Similarities", "Information","Symbol Search", "Coding")) %>% gather(key=Test, value=Score) 
   
ggplot(graph_wais_data_gathered) + aes(x=as.numeric(Score)) + geom_histogram(bins =19, 
fill = '#000000') + facet_wrap(~Test, ncol=5, nrow=2) + labs(x ='WAIS-IV Subtest Scaled 




Figure 4. Histograms of WAIS-IV Subtest Distribution 
graph_icar_data<- WAISICAR %>% select(c(LN16, MX16, VR16, R3D16)) 
   




graph_icar_data<-graph_icar_data %>% gather(key=Test, value=Score) 
   
ggplot(graph_icar_data) + aes(x=Score) + geom_histogram(bins =4, fill = '#000000') + 
facet_wrap(~Test, nrow=2) + labs(x = 'ICAR Subtest Score', y = 'Number of Participants')  + 




Figure 5. Histograms of ICAR16 Subtest Distributions 
ggplot(WAISICAR) + aes(x=FSIQ) + geom_histogram(bins =60, fill = '#000000')  + labs(x = 
'FSIQ Standard Score', y = 'Number of Participants')  + coord_cartesian(xlim=c(70, 145 )) + 
theme_minimal()  




Figure 6. Histogram of FSIQ Scores 
ggplot(WAISICAR) + aes(x=GAI) + geom_histogram(bins =60, fill = '#000000')  + labs(x = 
'GAI Standard Score', y = 'Number of Participants')  + coord_cartesian(xlim=c(70, 145 )) + 
theme_minimal()  




Figure 7. Histogram of GAI Scores 
ggplot(WAISICAR) + aes(x= TOTAL16) + geom_histogram(bins =16, fill = '#000000')  + labs(x 
= 'ICAR16 Total Score', y = 'Number of Participants')  + coord_cartesian(xlim=c(0, 16 ), ylim = 




Figure 8. Histogram of ICAR16 Total Scores 
ggplot(graph_wais_data_gathered) + aes(x=Score) + geom_density()+ facet_wrap(~Test, 
ncol=5, nrow=2) + labs(x ='WAIS-IV Subtest Scaled Score', y = 'Participants')  + 
coord_cartesian(xlim=c(0, 19)) + theme_minimal()  




Figure 9. Density Plots of WAIS-IV Subtest Scores 
ggplot(graph_icar_data) + aes(x=Score) + geom_density() + facet_wrap(~Test, nrow=2) + 





Figure 10. Density Plots of ICAR16 Subtest Scores 
ggplot(WAISICAR) + aes(x=FSIQ) + geom_density() + labs(x = 'FSIQ Standard Score', y = 
'Participants')  + coord_cartesian(xlim=c(70, 145 )) + theme_minimal()  




Figure 11. Density Plot of FSIQ Scores 
ggplot(WAISICAR) + aes(x=GAI) + geom_density()  + labs(x = 'GAI Standard Score', y = 
'Participants')  + coord_cartesian(xlim=c(70, 145 )) + theme_minimal()  




Figure 12. GAI Density Plot 
ggplot(WAISICAR) + aes(x= TOTAL16) + geom_density()  + labs(x = 'ICAR16 Total Score', y = 




Figure 13. Density Plot ICAR16 Total Score 






get_var<- function(dat) {  
  tidy(varTest(dat$Score, sigma.squared = 225)) %>% 
     select(estimate, statistic, p.value) 
  } 
 
get_var<- function(dat) {  
  tidy(varTest(dat$Score, sigma.squared = 225)) %>% 
     select(estimate, statistic, p.value) 
  } 
 
composites<- WAISICAR %>% dplyr::select(GAI, FSIQ) %>%   
  mutate(id = row.names(.)) %>% 
  gather(Composite, Score, -id) %>% 
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  do(get_var(.))  
 
colnames(styled_comp)<-c("Composite", "Sample Variance", "Chi-Square Difference Test 
Statistic", "P-Value") 
 
styled_comp<-styled_comp %>%mutate("Population Variance"= 225)  
styled_comp<-styled_comp[c(1, 2, 5, 3, 4)] 
 
styled_comp$`Sample Variance`<-round(styled_comp$`Sample Variance`, 2) 
styled_comp$`Chi-Square Difference Test Statistic`<-round(styled_comp$`Chi-Square 





papaja::apa_table(styled_comp, caption="WAIS-IV Composite Scores Sample vs. Population 
Variance") 
Table 15. WAIS-IV Composite Scores Sample vs. Population Variance 
Composite Sample Variance Population Variance ∆𝜒2 P-Value 
FSIQ 126.63 225.00 54.59 .00 
GAI 137.83 225.00 58.19 .00 




get_var<- function(dat) {  
  tidy(varTest(dat$Score, sigma.squared = 9)) %>% 






  mutate(id = row.names(.)) %>% 
  gather(Subtest, Score, -id) %>% 
  group_by(Subtest) %>%  
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  do(get_var(.)) 
 
colnames(standardized_subtests_helper)<-c("Subtest", "Sample Variance", "Chi-Square 
Difference Test Statistic", "P-Value") 
 
standardized_subtests_helper<-standardized_subtests_helper %>%mutate("Population 
Variance"= 9)  
standardized_subtests_helper<-standardized_subtests_helper[c(1, 2, 5, 3, 4)] 
 
standardized_subtests_helper$`Sample Variance`<-
round(standardized_subtests_helper$`Sample Variance`, 2) 
 
standardized_subtests_helper$`Chi-Square Difference Test Statistic`<-




  papaja::apa_table(standardized_subtests_helper, caption="WAIS-IV Scaled Scores Sample vs. 
Population Variance") 





Variance ∆𝜒2 p-value 
Arithmetic 6.07 9.00 62.68 .01 
Block Design 9.63 9.00 99.55 .60 
Coding 8.80 9.00 9.94 .92 
Digit Span 
Backward 
7.75 9.00 8.09 .34 
Digit Span 
Forward 
1.30 9.00 106.44 .32 
Digit Span 
Sequencing 
8.85 9.00 91.42 .95 
Digit Span Total 
Score 
8.14 9.00 84.16 .53 
Information 5.39 9.00 55.67 .00 
Matrix 
Reasoning 
7.80 9.00 8.65 .37 
Similarities 9.05 9.00 93.54 .93 
Symbol Search 8.92 9.00 92.21 .99 
Visual Puzzles 6.87 9.00 7.98 .09 




There is significantly less variance in the collected sample for the Information and Vocabulary 
subtests, which comprise the verbal comprehension broad ability composite (Gc). Thus, a 
correction for restriction of range should be applied to correlations with the Gc estimate. 








## Create subscores from the norming sample 
ICARcomplete<- completecases %>%  
  mutate(VR16= VR.04 + VR.16 +VR.19 +VR.17, LN16= LN.07 + LN.33 + LN.34 +LN.58, 
MX16= MR.45 + MR.46 + MR.47 + MR.55, R3D16= R3D.03 + R3D.04 + R3D.06 +R3D.08, 
TOTAL16= VR16 + MX16 + LN16 + R3D16) 
 
## Select cases with similar demographics to collected sample 
ICARCOMPLETEMATCH<- ICARcomplete %>%  
  filter(age>=18 & age<=45 & education != "less12yrs" & education != "GradOrProDegree" & 
status=="student") %>%  
  dplyr::select("id", "gender", "age", c(15:39), -c(32:34)) %>%  
  #create a new variable to indicate which sample the data comes from  
  mutate("SAMPLE_MATCH"='ICARNORM') 
 
## Make sure the column names match exactly 
colnames(ICARCOMPLETEMATCH)<-c("ID", "FEMALE", "AGE", "ACT",  "VR_04"  , 
"VR_16" ,   "VR_17",  "VR_19"  , "LN_07" ,  "LN_33", "LN_34", "LN_58", "MR_45", "MR_46", 
"MR_47", "MR_55", "R3D_03", "R3D_04", "R3D_06", "R3D_08",  "VR16", "LN16"  ,  "MX16" 
,   "R3D16",   "TOTAL16", "SAMPLE_MATCH" ) 
 
# Change all the -999 to missing 
ICARCOMPLETEMATCH[ICARCOMPLETEMATCH==-999]<- NA 
 
# Subset the collected sample to match variables in the norming subsample 
WIMATCH<- WAISICAR %>% 
  dplyr::select("ID", "AGE", "FEMALE", "ACT",  "VR_04"  , "VR_16" ,   "VR_17", "VR_19"  , 
"LN_07" ,  "LN_33", "LN_34", "LN_58",  "MR_45", "MR_46", "MR_47", "MR_55", "R3D_03", 
"R3D_04", "R3D_06", "R3D_08",   "LN16"  ,  "MX16", "VR16" ,   "R3D16", "TOTAL16" ) 
%>%   




# Combine the two samples in a new sample 
Matchsample<-rbind(WIMATCH, ICARCOMPLETEMATCH) 





TS<-tidy(leveneTest(Matchsample$TOTAL16 ~ Matchsample$SAMPLE_MATCH)) %>% 




LN<-tidy(leveneTest(Matchsample$LN16 ~ Matchsample$SAMPLE_MATCH)) %>% 




VR<- tidy(leveneTest(Matchsample$VR16 ~ Matchsample$SAMPLE_MATCH)) %>% 




MR<-tidy(leveneTest(Matchsample$MX16 ~ Matchsample$SAMPLE_MATCH)) %>% 




R3D<-tidy(leveneTest(Matchsample$R3D16 ~ Matchsample$SAMPLE_MATCH)) %>% 
mutate(variable="R3D16") %>% filter(df==1) %>% dplyr::select(c("variable", "statistic", 
"p.value")) 
 
Levene_tests<-bind_rows( LN, VR, MR, R3D,TS) 
colnames(Levene_tests)<-c("ICAR Subtest", "Levene Test Statistic", "P-Value") 
 
Levene_tests$`Levene Test Statistic`<-round(Levene_tests$`Levene Test Statistic`, 2) 
Levene_tests$`P-Value`<-round(Levene_tests$`P-Value`,2) 
 





Table 17. ICAR Subtest Scores Sample vs. Population Variance 
ICAR Subtest Levene Test Statistic p-value 
LN16 1.81 .18 
VR16 8.94 .00 
MX16 .38 .54 
R3D16 7.62 .01 
TOTAL16 .47 .49 
 
There is significantly less variance in the R3D and VR tasks in the collected sample when 
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Table 18. Uncorrected correlations with confidence intervals, WAIS-IV raw subtest scores and ICAR16 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
                
1. AR 16.41 3.08                           
                                
2. MR 21.14 3.67 .29**                         
      [.10, .47]                         
                                
3. BD 48.21 10.82 .30** .29**                       
      [.11, .47] [.10, .46]                       
                                
4. VP 17.77 3.97 .27** .38** .61**                     
      [.08, .45] [.19, .54] [.47, .72]                     
                                
5. DS 29.06 5.31 .45** .23* .17 .27**                   
      [.27, .59] [.04, .41] [-.03, .35] [.08, .44]                   
                                
6. VC 44.03 7.14 .31** .15 .12 .15 .36**                 
      [.11, .48] [-.05, .34] [-.08, .31] [-.05, .34] [.18, .52]                 
                                
7. SI 28.96 4.26 .36** .27** .16 .25* .27** .35**               
      [.18, .52] [.07, .44] [-.04, .35] [.05, .42] [.08, .45] [.16, .51]               
                                
8. IN 17.71 3.41 .44** .34** .24* .27** .22* .58** .30**             
      [.26, .59] [.15, .51] [.04, .42] [.08, .45] [.02, .41] [.43, .70] [.11, .47]             
                                
9. SS 35.33 8.41 .17 .11 .29** .20* .19 .08 .14 -.04           
      [-.03, .36] [-.09, .30] [.10, .46] [.00, .38] [-.01, .37] [-.12, .28] [-.06, .33] [-.24, .16]           
                                
10. CD 79.39 15.35 .20* .27** .18 .23* .16 .14 .27** .24* .50**         
      [.00, .39] [.08, .45] [-.02, .36] [.04, .41] [-.04, .35] [-.06, .33] [.07, .44] [.04, .42] [.34, .64]         
                                
11. LN16 2.37 1.56 .49** .44** .36** .30** .28** .23* .18 .42** .23* .33**       
      [.32, .63] [.26, .58] [.17, .52] [.11, .47] [.09, .45] [.03, .41] [-.02, .36] [.24, .57] [.03, .41] [.14, .50]       
                                
12. MX16 2.49 1.30 .32** .29** .34** .45** .27** .20* .16 .26* .16 .23* .41**     
      [.13, .49] [.10, .46] [.15, .51] [.27, .59] [.07, .44] [.00, .38] [-.04, .34] [.06, .44] [-.04, .34] [.03, .41] [.24, .57]     
                                
13. VR16 3.20 0.95 .25* .19 .42** .41** .36** .17 .33** .27** .11 .05 .37** .34**   
      [.05, .42] [-.01, .38] [.24, .57] [.23, .57] [.18, .52] [-.03, .36] [.14, .50] [.07, .44] [-.09, .30] [-.15, .24] [.19, .53] [.15, .50]   
                                
14. R3D16 1.67 1.47 .24* .12 .31** .32** .22* .32** .19 .21* .02 .10 .43** .40** .18 
      [.05, .42] [-.08, .31] [.12, .48] [.13, .49] [.02, .40] [.13, .49] [-.01, .37] [.01, .40] [-.18, .21] [-.10, .29] [.25, .58] [.21, .55] [-.02, .37] 
Note. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation. The confidence interval is a 




Table 19. Uncorrected correlations with confidence intervals, WAIS-IV scaled subtest scores and ICAR16 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
                
1. AR 12.01 2.53                           
                                
2. MR 11.99 2.78 .36**                         
      [.18, .53]                         
                                
3. BD 10.96 3.09 .31** .33**                       
      [.12, .48] [.14, .50]                       
                                
4. VP 11.26 2.61 .29** .42** .61**                     
      [.10, .46] [.24, .57] [.47, .72]                     
                                
5. DS 10.42 2.85 .43** .21* .20 .31**                   
      [.26, .58] [.01, .39] [-.00, .38] [.12, .48]                   
                                
6. VC 13.71 2.39 .30** .12 .09 .16 .31**                 
      [.10, .47] [-.08, .31] [-.11, .29] [-.04, .34] [.12, .48]                 
                                
7. SI 13.04 3.01 .38** .21* .19 .25* .22* .34**               
      [.19, .53] [.01, .39] [-.01, .37] [.06, .43] [.02, .40] [.15, .50]               
                                
8. IN 12.97 2.32 .44** .30** .27** .30** .21* .56** .23*             
      [.26, .59] [.11, .48] [.07, .44] [.10, .47] [.01, .39] [.41, .69] [.03, .41]             
                                
9. SS 10.78 2.99 .11 .06 .30** .20 .19 .05 .14 -.03           
      [-.09, .30] [-.14, .25] [.11, .47] [-.00, .38] [-.01, .38] [-.15, .25] [-.06, .33] [-.23, .17]           
                                
10. CD 11.38 3.00 .19 .25* .18 .26* .16 .08 .22* .18 .46**         
      [-.00, .38] [.06, .43] [-.02, .37] [.06, .44] [-.05, .34] [-.12, .28] [.03, .41] [-.02, .37] [.29, .61]         
                                
11. LN16 2.37 1.56 .49** .44** .35** .31** .26** .24* .18 .40** .21* .33**       
      [.32, .62] [.26, .59] [.17, .52] [.12, .48] [.07, .44] [.05, .42] [-.02, .37] [.21, .55] [.01, .39] [.14, .50]       
                                
12. MX16 2.49 1.30 .33** .29** .31** .45** .27** .21* .21* .26* .12 .22* .41**     
      [.14, .49] [.09, .46] [.12, .48] [.27, .59] [.07, .44] [.01, .39] [.02, .40] [.06, .44] [-.08, .31] [.03, .41] [.24, .57]     
                                
13. VR16 3.20 0.95 .24* .18 .38** .40** .35** .22* .32** .28** .14 .04 .37** .34**   
      [.04, .42] [-.01, .37] [.20, .54] [.22, .55] [.16, .51] [.02, .40] [.13, .49] [.09, .46] [-.06, .33] [-.17, .23] [.19, .53] [.15, .50]   
                                
14. 
R3D16 
1.67 1.47 .26** .13 .30** .32** .21* .26* .18 .22* .05 .05 .43** .40** .18 
      [.06, .44] [-.07, .32] [.11, .47] [.14, .49] [.01, .39] [.06, .43] [-.02, .37] [.03, .41] [-.15, .25] [-.15, .25] [.25, .58] [.21, .55] [-.02, .37] 
                                
Note. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation. The confidence interval is a 





Table 20. Range corrected correlations with confidence intervals, WAIS-IV scaled subtest scores and ICAR16 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
              
1. AR                           
                            
2. MR 
.42** 
                        
  [.24, .57]                         
3. BD 
.36** .32** 
                      
  [.18, .52] [.13, .49]                       
4. VP .34** .44** .60**                     
  [.15, .5] [.27, .59] [.46, .71]                     
5. DS .50** .22* .19 .33**                   
  
[.33, .63] [.02, .4] [-.01, .37] [.14, .49] 
                  
6. VC 
.35** .13 .09 .20 .32** 
                
  [.16, .51] [-.07, .32] [-.11, .28] [0, .38] [.13, .49]                 
7. SI .43** .23* .18 .25* .23* .34**               
  [.26, .58] [.03, .41] [-.01, .37] [.06, .43] [.03, .41] [.15, .5]               
8. IN .50** .38** .26*** .37** .22* .66** .30**             
  [.34, .64] [.2, .54] [.07, .44] [.19, .53] [.02, .4] [.54, .76] [.11, .47]             
9. SS .13 .06 .29** .20 .20 .05 .14 -.04           
  [-.07, .32] [-.14, .26] [.1, .46] [0, .38] [0, .38] [-.14, .25] [-.06, .33] [-.23, .16]           
10. CD 
.23* .25* .18 .26* .15 .08 .22* .18 .46** 
        
  [.03, .41] [.06, .43] [-.02, .36] [.06, .43] [-.04, .34] [-.12, .28] [.03, .4] [-.02, .37] [.29, .61]         
11. LN16 .55** .40** .34** .28** .27** .22* .16 .49** .18 .33**       
  
[.4, .67] [.21, .55] [.16, .51] [.09, .45] [.08, .45] [.02, .4] [-.04, .35] [.32, .63] [-.02, .37] [.14, .5] 
      
12. MX16 .38** .3188 .30** .43** .28** .20* .20* .33** .11 .22* .37**     
  [.2, .54] [.12, .48] [.11, .47] [.25, .58] [.09, .45] [.01, .38] [.01, .39] [.14, .49] [-.08, .31] [.03, .4] [.19, .53]     
13. VR16 .28** .20 .37** .45** .37** .27** .32** .36** .14 .04 .33** .32**   
  [.09, .45] [0, .38] [.19, .53] [.27, .59] [.18, .53] [.08, .45] [.13, .48] [.17, .52] [-.06, .33] [-.16, .23] [.14, .5] [.14, .49]   
14. R3D16 .30** .14 .29** .27** .22* .21* .15 .29** .04 .05 .38** .38** .15 
  [.11, .47] [-.06, .32] [.1, .46] [.08, .45] [.02, .4] [.02, .39] [-.05, .34] [.09, .46] [-.16, .24] [-.15, .25] [.2, .54] [.2, .54] [-.05, .34] 
Note. Restriction of range was corrected by using formula (1) from Bryant and Gohale (1972) and Alexander (1990). manual (David Wechsler, 2008) and the initial ICAR 
validation study (Condon & Revelle, 2014). Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each range corrected correlation. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p 





Table 21. Range-and-Reliability Corrected Correlations and Confidence Intervals 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
               
1. AR 
.88                          
                            
2. MR 
.47** .9                        
  [.31, .61]                         
3. BD .41** .36** .87                      
  [.24, .57] [.18, .52]                       
4. VP .38** .50** 0.68** .89                    
  [.2, .54] [.33, .63] [.56, .78]                     
5. DS 
.55** .24* .21* .36** .93                  
  
[.39, .67] [.04, .42] [.02, .39] [.18, .52]                   
6. VC 
.38** .14 .10 .21* .34** .94                
  [.2, .54] [-.06, .33] [-.1, .29] [.02, .39] [.16, .51]                 
7. SI .50** .26* .21* .28** .26* .38** .87              
  [.33, .63] [.06, .43] [.01, .39] [.09, .46] [.06, .43] [.19, .53]               
8. IN .55** .42** .29** .41** .23* .71** .33** .93            
  [.4, .68] [.24, .57] [.1, .46] [.23, .56] [.04, .41] [.59, .79] [.14, .49]             
9. SS .16 .07 .35** .23* .23* .06 .17** -.04 .81          
  [-.04, .34] [-.13, .27] [.16, .51] [.04, .41] [.04, .41] [-.14, .26] [-.03, .35] [-.24, .16]           
10. CD .26** .29** .21* .30** .17 .09 .26* .20* .55** .86        
  [.07, .44] [.1, .46] [.01, .39] [.1, .47] [-.02, .36] [-.11, .28] [.07, .43] [.01, .39] [.4, .68]         
11. LN16 .71** .51** .45** .36** .35** .27** .21* .61** .25* .43** .68      
  
[.6, .8] [.34, .64] [.28, .59] [.17, .52] [.16, .51] [.08, .44] [.01, .39] [.47, .72] [.05, .42] [.26, .58]      
12. MX16 .56** .45** .45** .63** .40** .29** .30** .47** .18 .33** .63** .52    
  
[.41, .69] [.28, .6] [.27, .59] [.5, .74] [.22, .56] [.1, .46] [.11, .47] [.3, .61] [-.02, .36] [.15, .5] [.49, .73]     
13. VR16 .39** .27** .52** .62** .49** .36** .44** .48** .20* .05 .52** .59** .59  
  [.21, .55] [.08, .45] [.36, .65] [.48, .73] [.33, .63] [.18, .52] [.27, .59] [.31, .62] [0, .38] [-.15, .24] [.36, .65] [.44, .7]   
14. R3D16 .38** .17 .37** .34** .26** .26* .19 .34** .05 .06 .54** .61** .23* .74 
  [.11, .47] [-.03, .35] [.18, .53] [.15, .5] [.07, .44] [.06, .43] [-.01, .37] [.16, .51] [-.15, .25] [-.14, .26] [.39, .67] [.47, .72] [.03, .41]  
Note. Formula (2) from Murphy and Davidshofer** ( 1988) applied to the range-corrected correlations in Table 9 using the reliabilities published in the WAIS-IV technical manual 
(David Wechsler, 2008) and the initial ICAR validation study (Condon & Revelle, 2014). * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01
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Appendix C: Informed Consent Documents 
 
The University of Texas at Austin 
Psychological and Educational Assessment Center (PEAC) 
 
Introduction   
The purpose of this form is to provide you information that may affect your decision as to 
whether or not to participate in this research study. The person performing the research will 
answer any of your questions.  Read the information below and ask any questions you might 
have before deciding whether or not to take part. If you decide to be involved in this study, this 
form will be used to record your consent.      
 
Purpose of the Study   
You have been asked to participate in a research study about the tools used to assess cognitive 
and academic abilities. The purpose of this study is to better understand the properties of the tests 
used to evaluate cognitive and academic abilities.  
  
What will you be asked to do? 
 If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked for your consent to have your 
assessment data analyzed for research purposes. Assessment information is protected under the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which protects the privacy of student 
educational records. Findings from this study will be included in research presentations or papers 
for publication. This study will take not take any of your time.       
 
What are the risks involved in this study? 
There are no foreseeable risks to participating in this study. 
  
What are the possible benefits of this study?   
You will receive no direct benefit from participating in this study; however, the findings from 
this study will advance our ability to assess cognitive and academic abilities.   
 
Do you have to participate?   
No, your participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate at all or, if you consent to 
allow your data to be used in the study, you may withdraw consent at any time. Withdrawal or 
refusing to participate will not affect your relationship with The University of Texas at Austin in 
any way.     
 
Will there be any compensation?  
You will not receive any type of payment participating in this study. 
 
How will your privacy and confidentiality be protected if you participate in this research 
study?   
Your privacy and the confidentiality of your data will be protected by storage on Qualtrics and 
UT Box. Any identifying information will be removed and replaced with a unique identifier. 
Qualtrics and UT Box have been approved by the University’s Information Security Office for 
use with Confidential (formerly known as Category I) university data, including HIPAA data. 
Only researchers involved in the study will have access to this data. If it becomes necessary for 
the Institutional Review Board to review the study records, information that can be linked to you 
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will be protected to the extent permitted by law. Your research records will not be released 
without your consent unless required by law or a court order. The data resulting from your 
participation may be made available to other researchers in the future for research purposes not 
detailed within this consent form. In these cases, the data will contain no identifying information 
that could associate it with you, or with your participation in any study.   
 
Whom to contact with questions about the study?  
Prior, during, or after your participation you can contact the researcher Dr. Timothy Keith or 
send an email to tzkeith@austin.utexas.edu for any questions or if you feel that you have been 
harmed.       
 
Whom to contact with questions concerning your rights as a research participant?   
For questions about your rights or any dissatisfaction with any part of this study, you can contact, 
anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board by phone at (512) 471-8871 or email at 
orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu.      
 
Participation  
By clicking the button below, you acknowledge that your participation in the study is voluntary, 
you are 18 years of age, and that you are aware that you may choose to terminate your 
participation in the study at any time and for any reason.   
o I consent. I agree to allow my de-identified assessment data to be used for research 
purposes.  






Educational Psychology Subject Pool and Volunteer Participants 
Consent for Participation in Research 
 
Title: Investigating the Convergent Validity of the ICAR and WAIS-IV 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this form is to provide you information that may affect your decision as to whether or 
not to participate in this research study.  The person performing the research will answer any of your 
questions.  Read the information below and ask any questions you might have before deciding 
whether or not to take part. If you decide to be involved in this study, this form will be used to record 
your consent. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research study is to examine the validity of a public domain measure of cognitive 
ability. Your participation in the study will contribute to a better understanding of freely accessible 
cognitive ability research tools. You are free to contact the investigator at the above address and 
phone number to discuss the study.  You must be at least 18 years old to participate. 
 
What will you be asked to do? 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to  
● You will complete an intake form that will gather information about your demographic 
background and educational experiences 
● You will complete a multiple-choice test of cognitive ability online. 
● You will complete an in-person assessment of cognitive ability with a trained graduate student 
administrator at the Psychological and Educational Assessment Center in the George I. Sanchez 
Building on the University of Texas at Austin Campus.  
 
This study will take an estimated 90-120 minutes and will include approximately 80 study 
participants.   
 
What are the risks involved in this study? 
There are no foreseeable risks to participating in this study. 
 
What are the possible benefits of this study? 
You will receive no direct benefit from participating in this study; however, you will contribute to 
research on freely accessible measurement tools that advance research in health care and the social 
sciences.   
 
Do you have to participate? 
No, your participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate at all or, if you start the study, 
you may withdraw at any time.  Withdrawal or refusing to participate will not affect your relationship 
with The University of Texas at Austin (University) in anyway.  
 
If you would like to participate you will receive a copy of this form. 
  
 
Will there be any compensation? 
 You will not receive any type of payment participating in this study. Students who choose to participate 
via the Department of Educational Psychology subject pool may receive course credit for their 
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participation. If they choose not to participate they can complete the alternative options addressed in their 
class course. 
 
How will your privacy and confidentiality be protected if you participate in this research study? 
Your privacy and the confidentiality of your data will be protected by removing identifying 
information from your data. Your data will be securely stored on UT Box, which meets security 
requirements for UT Category 1 data. 
 
If it becomes necessary for the Institutional Review Board to review the study records, information 
that can be linked to you will be protected to the extent permitted by law. Your research records will 
not be released without your consent unless required by law or a court order. The data resulting from 
your participation may be made available to other researchers in the future for research purposes not 
detailed within this consent form. In these cases, the data will contain no identifying information that 
could associate it with you, or with your participation in any study. 
 
Whom to contact with questions about the study?   
Prior, during or after your participation you can contact the researcher Stephanie Young at (612) 819-
4550 or send an email to Stephanie.young@utexas.edufor any questions or if you feel that you have 
been harmed.   
 
Whom to contact with questions concerning your rights as a research participant? 
For questions about your rights or any dissatisfaction with any part of this study, you can contact, 




 If you agree to participate, sign this form and return it to the researcher.  
 
Signature   
You have been informed about this study’s purpose, procedures, possible benefits and risks, and you 
have received a copy of this form. You have been given the opportunity to ask questions before you 
sign, and you have been told that you can ask other questions at any time. You voluntarily agree to 




Printed Name  
 
_________________________________    _________________ 
Signature Date 
 
As a representative of this study, I have explained the purpose, procedures, benefits, and the risks 
involved in this research study. 
 
_________________________________      
Print Name of Person obtaining consent      
 
 
_________________________________    _________________  




Appendix D: Demographic Survey 
What is your date of birth?  (Please enter MM/DD/YYYY) 
 
How do you identify your gender? 
o Male  
o Female  
o Other  
 
How do you identify your race? If you are more than one race, please select all that apply. 
o American Indian or Alaska Native  
o Asian  
o Black or African American  
o Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander  
o White  
o Other (please specify) ________________________________________________ 
 
Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
What was the primary language you spoke in the home growing up? 
o English  
o Spanish  
o Another language  
o English and Spanish equally  




What is the highest level of education achieved by your mother? 
o Less than a high school diploma  
o High school diploma  
o Some college or university experience  
o Associate degree  
o Bachelor's degree  
o Master's degree  
o Professional or Doctoral Degree (e.g. M.D., J.D., Ph.D. etc.)  
o I don't know  
 
What is the highest level of education achieved by your father? 
o Less than a high school diploma  
o High school diploma  
o Some college or university experience  
o Associate degree  
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o Bachelor's degree  
o Master's degree  
o Professional or Doctoral Degree (e.g. M.D., J.D., Ph.D. etc.)  
o I don't know  
 
How many years have you attended the University of Texas at Austin? 
o 1  
o 2  
o 3  
o 4  
o 5+  
 
Are you a transfer student? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
How many years at UT do you expect it will take you to graduate? 
o 3  
o 4  
o 5+  
 
What is your current major? 
 
What is your current college GPA? If you are unsure, please estimate.  
 
What was your final high school GPA? If you are unsure, please estimate. 
 
What was your final class rank in high school? If you are unsure, please estimate. (Please format 
your answer: rank position/size of graduating class) 
 
What high school did you attend? (If multiple, enter the school from which you earned your 
diploma) 
 
In what zip code did you attend high school? 
 
Did you take the... 
o SAT  
o ACT  
o Neither  
 
What was your score on the SAT? 
 
What was your score on the ACT? 
 
 
Have you previously undergone a psychological or educational evaluation? 
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o Yes  
o No 
Please describe the results of the evaluation.  
 
Did you receive special education services in a K-12 setting? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
Did you receive 504 accommodation services in a K-12 setting? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
What is the primary reason you are seeking assessment services? 
Please select  
o ADHD  
o Dyscalculia  
o Dyslexia  
o Dysgraphia  
o General learning difficulties  
o Anxiety  
o Other  
 




Appendix E:  The International Cognitive Ability Resource Sample Test (ICAR16) 
 








Zach is taller than Matt and Richard is shorter than Zach. Which of the following statements 
would be most accurate? 
o Richard is taller than Matt 
o Richard is shorter than Matt 
o Richard is as tall as Matt 
o It is impossible to tell 
 
Joshua is 12 years old and his sister is three times as old as he. When Joshua is 23 years old, how 
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Appendix F: Research Areas of Application 
 Cognitive abilities are implicated in every aspect of the human experience. A 
comprehensive review of research areas in which intelligence plays a role is beyond the scope of 
this manuscript. Rather, the following section provides a broad overview of a few important 
areas of application in which an accessible, well-validated measure of cognitive abilities such as 
the ICAR would be useful to researchers, including academic and professional achievement, and 
physical and mental health outcomes.  
Achievement. General intelligence is among the strongest predictors of both academic 
(Deary et al., 2007; Floyd et al., 2008; Rohde & Thompson, 2007; Taub et al., 2008) and 
professional achievement (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2015; Kuncel & Hezlett, 2001; Schmidt & 
Hunter, 1998). The connection between cognitive ability and achievement in these domains is 
intuitive; those who have greater cognitive capacity tend to perform better in situations that 
require learning and adapting to new tasks, like school and work. In fact, several definitions of 
cognitive ability include the capacity to learn and adapt to novel situations as a core function 
(Sternberg, 1985; Sternberg & Detterman, 1986; Wechsler, 1975). 
Academic Achievement. General intelligence and broad cognitive abilities measured by 
individual assessments strongly predict achievement scores in math, reading, and writing in 
children as young as six years of age (Flanagan, Fiorello, & Ortiz, 2010; Floyd et al., 2008; 
McGrew & Wendling, 2010; Taub et al., 2008). The predictive validity of intelligence constructs 
persists throughout the education system; scores on tests of cognitive abilities show strong 
predictive validity for primary and secondary school grades (Laidra, Pullmann, & Allik, 2007; 
Roth et al., 2015), standardized test scores (Frey & Detterman, 2004) and success in higher 
education (Barchard, 2003; Kuncel & Hezlett, 2001; Murray & Wren, 2003).  
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The relation between academic achievement and intelligence remains significant after 
controlling for relevant factors like socioeconomic status (SES) (Deary et al., 2007; von Stumm, 
2017).  In a large study of children ages 7 to 16, cognitive ability scores accounted for 
approximately 40% of the variance in academic performance and growth, while SES only 
accounted for 2% and 8%, respectively (von Stumm, 2017). Other evidence suggests larger 
direct effects from SES but the effect of cognitive ability remains a significant predictor after 
controlling for SES and multiple other relevant covariates (Marks, 2016; Mistry, Biesanz, Chien, 
Howes, & Benner, 2008; Pearce et al., 2016).  
The effect of SES on achievement may be influenced by the development of cognitive 
abilities in early childhood development (Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010). Lack of access to 
perinatal care, nutrition, and early cognitive stimulation, hinders cognitive development in early 
childhood (Appoh & Krekling, 2004; Hackman et al., 2010; Lopez Boo, 2016), to the extent that 
cognitive ability is almost entirely predicted by environmental factors at low levels of SES 
(Turkheimer, Haley, Waldron, D’Onofrio, & Gottesman, 2003). Furthermore, the gap in IQ 
scores between low and high SES students almost triples from age 7 to age 16 (von Stumm & 
Plomin, 2015). Despite substantial evidence of the relation between SES and cognitive ability, 
much remains unknown about the underlying causal mechanisms (Hackman et al., 2010). 
Measuring and controlling for cognitive abilities in education research will elucidate the complex 
relationships between factors that influence school learning and cognitive development, and 




Professional Achievement. Because cognitive abilities play such an essential role in academic 
achievement, it is no surprise that both general and specific cognitive abilities appear to affect 
achievement beyond the education system, in many occupational fields (Bertua, Anderson, & 
Salgado, 2005; Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Salgado et al., 2003; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). 
Cognitive abilities also predict indicators of success related to occupational performance such as 
income, occupational prestige, and management status (Strenze, 2007; Wai & Rindermann, 
2015). The predictive validity of tests of cognitive abilities has led many organizations to 
incorporate them as part of their personnel selection processes (Cortina, Goldstein, Payne, 
Davison, & Gilliland, 2000). Despite the success of these measures in talent acquisition, research 
on cognitive ability measurement in industrial settings has remained relatively stagnant in recent 
years, and more standardized, theory-driven measures are needed (Scherbaum, Goldstein, Yusko, 
Ryan, & Hanges, 2012).  
The importance of cognitive abilities in academic and professional domains is well-
established. However, cognitive ability variables are not always considered in research 
conducted in these fields. The availability of a psychometrically-sound, theoretically-guided 
measure of cognitive abilities in the public domain will advance the precision and accuracy of 
research in fields in which learning is of primary interest, such as work and school.  
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Health Outcomes. Cognitive epidemiology is emerging as an important line of research 
that could benefit from accessible cognitive ability measurement tools.  A number of studies 
have demonstrated that general intelligence significantly predicts mortality from a variety of 
causes (Batty et al., 2008; Der, Batty, & Deary, 2009; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & 
Goldberg, 2007; Sörberg, Allebeck, & Hemmingsson, 2014). The increased mortality risk 
associated with low cognitive ability is related to a wide variety of physical and mental health 
considerations.  
Physical Health Outcomes. For example, Batty and colleagues (2008) found cognitive 
ability predicts mortality from cardiovascular disease at a similar level to smoking, and more 
strongly than body mass index, total cholesterol, blood pressure or blood glucose levels. This 
relation continued to be significant even after controlling for confounding factors such as 
childhood SES. Several other studies have found a significant relation between early intelligence 
and specific health outcomes later in life, such as unintentional injury (Lawlor, Clark, & Leon, 
2007; Whitley et al., 2010), obesity (Yu, Han, Cao, & Guo, 2010), pain (Gale, Deary, Cooper, & 
Batty, 2012), and addiction (Cadar & Kaushal, 2017).  
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Mental Health Outcomes. Low cognitive abilities in childhood are also associated with increased 
risk for mental health problems later in life, including depression, anxiety, autism, and 
schizophrenia (Gale, Batty, Tynelius, Deary, & Rasmussen, 2010; Zammit et al., 2004). A recent 
American study found low childhood IQ to be associated with increased relapse and duration of 
depressive episodes, as well as increase suicidal ideation and attempt later in life (Hung et al., 
2015). A longitudinal study of  987,308 Swedish men found that for each unit increase in score 
on a logic test, the risk of suicide decreased by 12%  (Gunnell, Magnusson, & Rasmussen, 
2005). The authors suggested the relation between suicidality and low cognitive ability is 
explained by either by shared etiology of mental health problems and cognitive function, an 
individual’s inability to cope with stressors given limited cognitive resources, or some 
combination of those causes.  
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Mechanism of Influence. Although the causal nature of the relation between early life 
intelligence and mortality remains unclear, several explanations have been speculated. One 
possibility is that high cognitive abilities are a reflection of overall brain health, or “system 
integrity” (Deary et al., 2009; Deary, Weiss, & Batty, 2010). This perspective is illustrated well 
through the lens of aging. Research has demonstrated cognitive decline is a normal part of the 
aging process, even in the absence of pathology (Salthouse, 2009). Physiological degeneration of 
the brain leads to cognitive decline, and there is evidence that medical disorders in earlier life 
increase the risk of early dementia (Brayne, 2007). Conversely, individuals who demonstrate 
higher levels of cognitive ability early in life, also referred to as cognitive reserve, tend to be able 
to better defend against both cognitive and physical decline associated with aging and disease 
(Schwartz, Quaranto, Healy, Benedict, & Vollmer, 2013; Stern, 2009). From this viewpoint, 
intelligence has a reciprocal relation with overall health and well-being, and is important to 
measure and track throughout the lifespan.  
High cognitive ability may also reduce the likelihood of mortality by promoting health 
behaviors, as individuals who are more knowledgeable about behavioral risk factors for illness 
and injury are better equipped to manage their health. This idea is supported by lower rates of 
engagement in health risk behaviors by individuals with higher cognitive ability. Longitudinal 
studies demonstrate decreased likelihood of smoking later in life among children who score 
highly on tests of cognitive abilities (Batty, Deary, & Macintyre, 2007; Martin, Fitzmaurice, 
Kindlon, & Buka, 2004), and increased likelihood of quitting for those who take up the habit in 
early adulthood (M. D. Taylor et al., 2003). Adults who binge drink are more likely to have 
lower cognitive ability scores in childhood than adults who consume alcohol moderately (Batty, 
Deary, & Macintyre, 2006), and adults with higher concurrent cognitive ability scores are less 
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likely to be overweight or obese (Chandola, Deary, Blane, & Batty, 2006; Deary, Whalley, 
Batty, & Starr, 2006). In a cohort of 420 children, higher intelligence at age 12 was generally 
associated with more favorable health behaviors at age 16, such as delay in onset of smoking and 
less time watching TV (Ciarrochi, Heaven, & Skinner, 2012). Though these relations do not 
necessarily imply causality, they demonstrate a longitudinal relation between cognitive ability 
and health behaviors that has ample potential for further research.   
Behavioral Interventions. The relation between cognitive abilities and health behaviors 
yields another important research application of cognitive ability measurement; the influential 
role of cognitive abilities in behavioral interventions. Health literacy (i.e., the ability to 
understand health information and make appropriate health-related decisions) is associated with 
better health outcomes and use of health services (Sheridan et al., 2011). Health literacy has been 
shown to be highly correlated with early and concurrent cognitive ability (Mõttus et al., 2014). 
Based on this connection, researchers have suggested that interventions to improve health 
literacy may be informed by interventions that target general cognitive ability (Nisbett et al., 
2012), and prevention and health services may be more effective if tailored to individual 
cognitive needs (Mõttus et al., 2014).  The latter strategy has already been implemented in 
mental health services, where cognitive behavioral therapy has been successfully adapted for 
individuals with lower cognitive abilities (Taylor, Lindsay, & Willner, 2008). Though a large 
amount of research supports the connection between general cognitive ability and physical and 
mental health outcomes, relatively little has examined its moderating effects on intervention 
effectiveness (Baker et al., 2007; Mõttus et al., 2014). Barriers to access to psychometrically 
sound measures that suit the needs of these researchers may result in cognitive abilities being 
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overlooked as an important influence or moderator in the effectiveness of psychoeducational 
programs.  
Summary. Cognitive abilities influence a wide range of fields of research, including 
education, healthcare, psychology, and industry. The relation between cognitive abilities and 
individual outcomes in these areas is well established, but much remains unknown about the 
nature and direction of these relations, and how a better understanding these relations can 
improve interventions, programs, and public policy. Accessible, validated measurement tools in 
the public domain will encourage broader study of cognitive abilities as they relate to other areas 





Appendix G: A Brief Comment on the Historical Context of Intelligence Theories 
The roots of contemporary intelligence theories tend to be traced back to the work of Sir 
Francis Galton, who used Darwin’s ideas to argue that “genius” is a normally distributed and 
heritable characteristic of humans (Brody, 2000). Galton argued for the existence of racial 
hierarchies, and is the founder of the field of “eugenics” (Galton, 1883). Though he is thought to 
be a pioneer in the field, his work is also seen in large part as responsible for the racist and 
oppressive ideologies underlying the history of intelligence theory and testing in the 19th 
century, some of which continue on in the discourse around intelligence today (Cravens, 1978; 
Gould, 1996; Suzuki & Valencia, 1997; Valencia, 2010).  
The development of a new test of intelligence would not be complete without 
acknowledgment of the racially and culturally biased ideologies that dominated the field for most 
of the 20th century (Valencia, 2010). An early application of intelligence tests in the United 
States was the evaluation of immigrants at Ellis Island to determine who was fit for various jobs, 
entry into the country, or to have children (Gould, 1996). Hereditarian views of intelligence have 
also played a role in the systemic racism of the U.S. education system. Opponents of integration 
used these arguments to prevent Black students from enrolling in White schools in the mid-
1900’s (Cook, 1979). These issues persist in the current U.S. education system; disproportionate 
identification of racial, ethnic, and language minorities in special education (e.g. Artiles & Trent, 
1994; Harry, Arnaiz, Klingner, & Sturges, 2008; Morgan et al., 2015; Sullivan & Bal, 2013) has 
led many scholars to suggest that intelligence testing, and even the concept of intelligence itself, 
perpetuates systematic bias and institutionalized racism (Blanchett, 2006; Codrington & 
Fairchild, 2012; Fraser, 2008; Skiba, Poloni-Staudinger, Simmons, Renae Feggins-Azziz, & 
Chung, 2005).   
 
 108 
The full extent to which group-hierarchical ideologies of human intelligence have been 
applied in oppressive ways to various peoples is extensive, pervasive, and outside the scope of 
this paper. Still, it is important to recognize the ways in which ideas about human intelligence 
have been misapplied and misunderstood throughout history in order to avoid these missteps in 
future work. As history has demonstrated, the study of individual differences has the potential for 
corruption across the field of psychology when extrapolated to diverse groups of people 
(Betancourt & López, 1993).  
Yet the field need not be abandoned completely to resist cultural bias and oppression. 
Alternatively, intelligence researchers may recall the original intentions of Alfred Binet, the 
French psychologist who, along with Simone Theodore, developed the first cognitively based 
intelligence test (Binet & Simon, 1916). According to Siegler (1992), Binet was compelled to 
create a more objective assessment in order to help identify children who needed special 
education services, rather than relying on the (often biased) judgments of teachers and family 
members. From this perspective, standardized assessments of cognitive abilities have created a 
fairer system of evaluation for many individuals. But Binet also recognized the limitations of his 
measure, cautioning users of the test that IQ scores were influenced by a complex interplay of 
factors variable throughout the lifespan, and thus comparisons of children from different 
backgrounds are not interpretable (Siegler, 1992). Furthermore, Messick (1979) argues that 
contemporary intelligence test developers have an ethical responsibility to evaluate not only the 
validity of assessments in terms of their measurement properties, but also the social 
consequences of their use.  
Though historically practitioners and scholars have not always heeded the cautions of 
Binet and others, the field of intelligence research has undoubtedly become more rigorous and 
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robust (Brody, 2000; Neisser et al., 1996). Advances in technology have made the evaluation and 
refinement of intelligence theories and measures more feasible (Cudeck & MacCallum, 2012). 
As a result, the psychometric approach to defining and understanding the concept of intelligence 
has prevailed over the last century (Keith & Reynolds, 2012; Naglieri, 2015). Advanced 
statistical approaches have fostered a number of studies examining racial, ethnic, and gender bias 
of cognitive assessments (e.g. Keith, 1999; Keith, Quirk, Schartzer, & Elliott, 1999; Keith, 
Reynolds, Roberts, Winter, & Austin, 2011; Waschl et al., 2016). A better understanding of the 
systemic racism, sexism, and cultural bias that plagues most American institutions will further 
improve research quality across the domains of psychology. Despite improvements since the 
field’s inception, it is important to consider the oppressive potential of cognitive testing, 
especially when considering new applications of cognitive ability measurement such as those 
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